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Abstract
In 1927,  Martin  Heidegger  published his  magnum opus,  Being and Time,  which 
sought to ground the nature of the specifically human existence in temporality. Of primary 
importance in understanding the nature of being in general, was to understand the human 
experience - that he labelled Dasein - as a historical process, an occurrence; the movement of 
which  defined  the  very  nature  of  being.  Heidegger  differentiated  between  two  potential 
modes of being of Dasein, one grounded in the world with others, into which it is thrown 
(inauthentic), and another wherein Dasein could be grounded in itself (authentic). In order to 
move authentically Dasein required a kind of access to itself that became possible only by 
way  of  a  particular  phenomenon,  labelled  as  conscience  [Gewissen].  Conscience  and 
Gewissen  are terms both derived ultimately from the Greek συνείδησις  [syneidesis]  and 
have evolved and developed throughout the history of philosophy, from its beginnings in 
Homer, through Paul the Apostle and many others, to find itself firmly implanted in popular 
culture.  However,  the  conceptions  of  conscience  visible  throughout  its  history  differ 
radically from the conscience that is outlined in Being and Time. 
Like those that came before it,  Heidegger’s conception of conscience is involved 
with being guilty, it calls and attests, but Heidegger’s formulation is unique in that it lacks 
any specific content. In fact, instead of offering something to be heard, conscience is itself 
carefully designated by Heidegger as a specific type of listening, a hearkening [Horchen], 
which is further characterised as a type of resolved preparation: a readiness for being able to 
be summoned.  This essay proposes that such a description intimates a specific temporality 1
of conscience. This is not to say that Heidegger’s conscience is something that occurs as an 
experience within a sequence of events. Instead, the phenomenon must be grounded as an 
occurrence,  that  is  as  something  necessarily  temporal  and  historical.  This  argument  is 
secured by equating Heidegger’s conscience with the ancient Greek concept of the καιρός 
[kairos] with which it shares a great deal. Ultimately, this examination leads us to reconsider 
the  specific  temporality  of  discourse  as  something  that  might  itself  be  described  as 
“kairological”.  By  considering  conscience  in  this  manner,  and  describing  it  in  temporal 
terms,  it  becomes possible to situate the phenomenon more securely within the unity of 
Dasein as care.  
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. J Stambaugh, Rev. D Schmidt (New York, State University 1
of  New York, 1927 [2010]) p276
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
§ 1 - DEFINING THE QUESTION
“But there remains solely the saga of the way
(along which there opens up) how it stands with to-be
for along this (way) many indications of it are given;
how Being without genesis and without decay,
 complete, standing fully there alone,
 without trembling in itself and not at all in need of finishing;
 nor was it before, nor will it be someday,
for as the present, it is all-at-once, unique unifying united
 gathering itself in itself from itself (holding itself together full of presentness)” 
- Heidegger’s translation of Parmenides Fragment 8 (Lines 1-6)2
In 1927,  Martin  Heidegger  published his  magnum opus,  Being and Time,  which 
sought  to  address  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  being.  Of  primary  importance  in 
understanding the nature of being in general, was to understand the experience specific to the 
human  being,  that  he  labelled:  Dasein.  Heidegger’s  solution  to  this  question  remained 
ultimately  unfinished,  but  attempted  to  elucidate  the  specific  temporality  of  Dasein,  the 
movement of which he saw as defining the very nature of being. He positioned Dasein as an 
historical process, an occurrence, the unfolding of which could occur in different ways. To 
Heidegger, initially and for the most part, Dasein would exist as inauthentic [uneigentlich], 
thrown into and grounded in the world with others like it  and unfolding itself in a time 
shared  with  them.  However,  Dasein  could  also  be  potentially  authentic  [eigentlich]  by 
modifying its historical movement in such a way that it could ground itself in itself. In order 
to unfold authentically, Dasein required access to itself, that it might gather “itself in itself 
from itself.” This was shown to be possible only by way of a particular phenomenon known 
as conscience [Gewissen].
Conscience is described by Heidegger as being a “call” [Ruf], one that comes over 
Dasein, calling from afar to afar. As a call, conscience is a phenomenon grounded in the 
primordial movement of Dasein as “discourse”. When we speak of discourse here we are 
 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, Trans. G Fried and R Polt (New Haven, Yale University 2
Press, 2000[1935]) p105
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referring ultimately to Dasein’s disclosure, that is its nature as that which reveals its world, 
and perhaps itself. Discourse [Rede] is a term used by Heidegger that he relates directly to 
the ancient Greek concept of λόγος, which refers to the peculiar capacity of the human to 
use language to communicate its openness to its world. Dasein’s coming into language is 
something that  it  does primordially,  and is  bound up with its  being from the outset.  To 
Heidegger, “language” is an expression in the communal world of this internal capacity of 
discourse,  and  it  orients  Dasein  in  a  specific  manner  toward  its  world,  and  itself,  that 
determines its movement. Communal coming into words is named by Heidegger as “idle 
talk” [Gerede],  and tends to  cover  over  the truth of  experience rather  than unveiling or 
opening it for Dasein. Although discourse is made explicit as the manner of access to beings 
and  the  place  in  which  beings  were  to  be  encountered,  Dasein  itself  is  described  as 
something ineluctably enigmatic, avoiding definition and uncovering in the very nature of its 
being. For this reason, Dasein’s gaining access to itself through discourse is not a simple 
process.
Heidegger explains that in order to be authentic, Dasein must first find itself, must be 
“shown to itself”, despite its nature as that which avoids disclosure. Heidegger locates the 
appropriate access in an expression of discourse that he labels “attestation” [Bezeugung], 
which  unlike  language  professes  or  purports  to  bring  something  forth  without  actually 
producing it  as  objectively given.  Instead of  through language or  speech,  the access  of 3
Dasein to itself comes by way of a particular kind of listening [hören]. What is listened for is 
the silent attestation of conscience, a phenomenon of Dasein itself. It is a strange and silent 
call, that comes over Dasein but also from Dasein. The enigmatic and abysmal character of 
Dasein is closely related to the character of silence, as the possible location of that which 
cannot be made clear.  In order to hear something specifically lacking in content,  however, a 4
special kind of listening is required. One ‘listens out for’ the call, rather than ‘listening to’ it, 
and this specific listening out is termed “hearkening” [horchen]  by Heidegger: a reticent 
waiting for the call. Unlike speech, which has the character of making present, hearkening is 
instead to do with something that is expected as a possibility, which speaks to the nature of 
conscience itself  as  outstanding or  anticipated.  Our  primary task will  be  to  uncover  the 
character of this anticipation.
In Being and Time, Heidegger makes clear from the outset of his discussion that his 
conception of conscience differs fundamentally from that of his antecedents. Conscience first 
finds its roots in the Greek σύνοιδα word group. As a verb, this root is expressed in various 
 Ryan Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions (Chicago, University of  Chicago Press, 2015) p1363
 Frank Schalow, Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred (Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media) p544
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forms from the 6th Century BCE, generally indicating a being conscious of something or 
someone. As with conscience, σύνοιδα and its derivations are composite verbs. The prefix 
“σύν-“ strictly means “with”, and “οιδα” is itself the perfect indicative active form of the 
verb εἰδῶ, which roughly translates as “to know”. Essentially, σύνοιδα was a capacity to 
see, to “understand”, an idea that one shares with others. Rather paradoxically, what was 
delineated as a sharing of understanding with another, σύνοιδα  and its derivatives could 
take a reflexive as well as a non-reflexive form. What is meant by this is that the subject can 
“know with” another (non-reflexive), or simply with one’s self (reflexive). Although unclear 
in its nature, the “with-ness” of the ancient conscience evoked a sense of conscience as a 
“voice”,  a  coming  into  language,  which  we  established  already  as  being  fundamentally 
distant from Heidegger’s formulation. Conscience, in its evolution into the latin language, 
particularly in Cicero, came to represent something that followed along with the definite 
deeds of Dasein, having an essentially critical function.  This conscience had to do with the 5
law, written into the being of men, that represented the source of guilt. 
Heidegger’s conscience was also “guilty” [schuldig], but his own conception of this 
idea  was radially  at  odds  with  Cicero’s,  having necessarily  nothing to  do with  concrete 
goings on in the world. This is not to align Heidegger’s conscience with something spiritual 
or beyond this world, as he also distances his conception from the modern Christian form of 
conscience as the voice of God. To Heidegger, conscience is not to do with a sense of “good” 
or  “evil”,  nor  is  it  something  like  Paul  the  Apostle’s  conscience  that  “reprimands”  or 
“warns”.  In  order  to  understand Heidegger’s  specific conception of  conscience  we must 
separate it significantly from its previous formulations. However, it is in his study of Paul 
that Heidegger’s own journey into the concept may have taken flight, and it is here we begin 
to see threads of language common to Heidegger’s conception, of “attestation” and “giving 
testament”, beginning to emerge in a different sense. It  is also through Heidegger’s own 
deconstruction of the writings of Paul, outlined in The Phenomenology of Religion, that our 
analysis of conscience as temporal takes root. 
Although Heidegger’s thought is still in its infancy when the lectures are delivered in 
1920/21, we see in them already the language of conscience coming forth, intertwined with 
Heidegger’s novel sense of temporality. Heidegger here begins to elevate the historical as 
something vital to any attempt at philosophy. To Heidegger, if philosophy was going to avoid 
reduction into a  science,  it  would need to identify concrete sciences themselves in their 
enactment,  and  the  scientific  process  would  need  to  be  laid  out  in  its  foundations  as 
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p2785
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historical.  Heidegger  indicated  that  we  must  subject  the  knowledge  of  science  and  the 6
history of religion both to a phenomenological “destruction” [Destruktion], which represents 
a return to the “things in themselves” as they occur within the enactment-historical situation. 
Thus,  in  The Phenomenology of  Religion,  Heidegger’s  task is  to  attempt to  uncover  the 
“experience”  [Erfahrung]  that  lies  beneath  Paul’s  explication.  This  process  uncovers  a 
specific kind of temporality, wherein: “The present time has already reached its end and a 
new [αιον] has begun since the death of Christ” . In light of this imminent ending, the early 7
Christian is forced to consider the nature of their comportment or “enactment” [Vollzug] of 
life. For Paul, conscience has to do with a kind of moral guide or law, but more primordially 
it relates to the relationship between the Christian and God. The conscience of the authentic 
Christian demands they recognise the already coming to an end of this world, the παρουσία, 
and to take on an attitude toward life that is fitting of this truth. Thus, for Heidegger’s Paul it 
is the conscience that lies upon a sort of boundary between the “when” of the παρουσία and 
the “how” of enactment. Heidegger focuses on the role of proclamation for the authentic 
Christian, which he aligns with the idea of a “call”. The Christian, like authentic Dasein, in 
hearing  a  call,  finds  themself  in  a  special  moment,  a  specific  kind  of  temporality,  that 
radically redefines the enactment of life itself. This moment is the καιρός [kairos]: the right 
or opportune time. Thus, we see a way that “attestation”, the “call” and “conscience” may be 
involved with temporality.
Following The Phenomenology of Religion, specifically in those writings leading up 
to Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to establish the specific nature of the being of Dasein 
as  temporal.  The  answer  to  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  being  demands  a 
phenomenological approach for Heidegger, but he recognised that even this was complicated 
by the hermeneutic situation. He saw that any attempt to understand the nature of being, 
even science, would be grounded necessarily in the perspective of the interpreter. This very 
fact, however, represents the starting point for access to Dasein in Being and Time: that is the 
sense  of  “always-already”.  Dasein  is  thrust  into  a  world  that  contains  ideas,  values  and 
influences and is concerned with them necessarily, and this is reflective of the basic nature of 
Dasein as “care” [Sorgen]. The always-already becomes a horizon for understanding the very 
movement of Dasein, as something that has a kind of “past”, more appropriately labelled as a 
“history” [Geschichte]. Dasein is not involved with its history in a detached sense but rather 
engages with it actively, concernedly, in a movement that is dynamic and plastic. Dasein is 
primordially concerned with how it will be, based upon that which it already is. The past of 
 Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of  Religious Life, Trans. Heidegger, M Fritsch and J Gosetti-6
Ferencei  (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010) p10-11
 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of  Religious Life, p697
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Dasein is perpetually in movement with the future to create the movement of Dasein in the 
present. Thus, Dasein is shown to be primordially temporal: a movement, an occurrence, that 
is grounded essentially on these temporal ecstasies [Ekstasen] or horizons. 
The problem for Dasein is that it is thrust into the world at birth, a world with others 
like it. This being-with others prevents Dasein from establishing itself as authentic from the 
outset. Dasein is even brought into a kind of common time, capable of being shared but 
impossible to grasp as entire. Dasein is able to alter its movement, and disentangle itself 
from its dispersal in others, but only through a unique relationship with its situation. By 
taking a position toward its death, and accepting the anxiety that such a stance brings, Dasein 
is capable of grounding itself in a new completeness, as that which is stretched out between 
its birth and death. This sense of completeness is extremely complex, and will be further 
outlined  below.  For  now  we  must  simply  acknowledge  that  Dasein’s  authentic  stance 
towards itself  and its  history is  made possible  by conscience:  the silent  call  that  “jolts” 
Dasein from its everyday understanding of its situation. Conscience is specifically outlined 
by Heidegger to be the “call of care”, a “phenomenon of Dasein.” If we are to understand the 
caller of conscience to be Dasein itself, and Dasein as primordially temporal, then it follows 
that there must be a way to describe conscience in temporal terms.  
There is a kind of temporality implicit in Heidegger’s identification of conscience as 
a modifying force, something that spurs a kind of change. In Being and Time, conscience is 
nothing like a voice that appears in a series of present experiences, not something that can be 
present then fall out of being into the forgotten. Vitally though, it is also not a persistently 
occurring  experience.  In  a  sense,  authentic  understanding  “follows”  the  call,  but  not  as 
something annexed to conscience, that occurs as conscience ends. Instead, authenticity and 
the call must be understood as part of the unity of experience that is Dasein. Essentially, the 
call of conscience has to do with the situation of Dasein itself, as part of Dasein and wrapped 
up in its movement as occurrence. Earlier we made reference to the nature of conscience as a 
“silent call”, to do not with a speaking but rather a hearing. This hearing was characterised as 
a  kind  of  readiness,  a  waiting  resolute  in  the  face  of  something  impending.  What  this 
indicates is  that  conscience is  a  kind of  possibility for  Dasein,  part  of  its  understanding 
nature and thus involved with its temporal ecstasies. However, conscience is not something 
that  remains  always  as  something  “not  yet”,  as  it  comes  over  Dasein  in  a  way.  The 
“moment” of conscience, is something that comes as an abrupt arousal, with the character of 
a “jolt”. The temporal movement of conscience as described above is reminiscent of another 
ancient Greek concept, a specific kind of temporality that is always impending but equally 
sudden in its coming: the καιρός.
Conscience and Time !5
The καιρός  itself  is  no simple phenomenon either,  but finds various expressions 
throughout the history of philosophy. From its beginnings as a kind of mortal blow, the term 
morphs and develops to indicate a kind of “opportunity”, not just the right action but also to 
do with timing.  Later,  in  the works of  Plato,  the καιρός  has  evolved to  come to mean 
something  like  the  “right  time”,  in  which  something  of  importance  can  happen,  and  it 
essentially  constitutes  the basis  of  historical  decision and action.  Through Aristotle,  the 8
καιρός  becomes tied to φρόνησῐς.  Φρόνησῐς  was a primary focus of Heidegger’s,  and 
relates in many ways to his formulation of authenticity. In Aristotle, the καιρός represents 
that which stands on the boundary between the situation and “phronetic” enactment. As born 
out of the situation, and thus the history of the individual, the καιρός is always present in a 
way similar to that of conscience, and also comes abruptly and without warning in a moment 
without duration. The καιρός to Aristotle is a modifying force that lends itself to, or even 
demands, new activity. As aforementioned, in the writings of Paul, the καιρός refers to a 
specific temporality, similar to that of the authentic time established in the Second Division 
of Being and Time, and access to it is opened by “proclamation”: a special kind of call. In 
Aristotle and Paul both, the καιρός, like Heidegger’s conscience, represents that moment in 
which the individual takes heed of their situation, historical and deeply personal, and moves 
to engage their world in a way that takes the “truth” of their situation into account. It is an 
occurrence,  bound  up  with  and  born  out  of  the  occurrence  of  Dasein  itself,  that  has  a 
modifying force. Already we can see that a description of conscience in temporal terms, by 
way of a comparison with the καιρός, makes more explicit the way that conscience might be 
situated within the unity of Dasein as temporal.
As aforementioned, Heidegger’s Dasein and its conscience are enigmatic subjects. 
The mystery of conscience is only made more pronounced by its, perhaps ironically, sudden 
appearance in Heidegger’s work in Being and Time. Little in his earlier works deals directly 
with  conscience  (these  mentions  are  outlined  below)  making  it  difficult  to  establish  the 
evolution  of  the  idea  in  his  works  as  a  whole.  Even  more  remarkable  than  this  is  the 
disappearance entirely of the idea from the thinking of Heidegger, as displayed in his later 
works, despite its truly pivotal position in the arc Being and Time. As a result of this, our 
analysis not only seeks to highlight the position of conscience within the overall movement 
of Dasein, but also to justify its position through an analysis of the works leading up to the 
1927 text. What becomes clear in this is that the language he has used in his description of 
conscience  resonates  most  deeply  with  his  analysis  found  within  the  first  part  of  The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life. Further, this specific text represents the meeting place of 
 John Smith,Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’: “Chronos and Kairos” in The Monist, Vol 53(1) Philosophy of  8
History, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Jan 1969), p7
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Heidegger’s treatment of theological ideas, such as conscience, and the unique temporality 
we will find fully expressed in Being and Time.
To begin this journey, however, we must begin with a discussion of the nature of 
discourse, as that in which Heidegger ultimately grounds his conception of conscience. We 
will  then move to  a  discussion of  the  historical  formulations  of  conscience,  in  order  to 
clearly delineate that from which Heidegger’s formulation differs and the reasons why. This 
chapter leads inevitably into the discussion of the role of conscience in Paul, and then to 
Heidegger’s own analysis of those works. It is here that the interrelation between conscience 
and temporality begins to take shape, and an outline of the temporality of Dasein and then 
specifically conscience in Being and Time, follows. The most crucial chapters of the work 
come at  the end,  where an exploration of the concept of  the καιρός  reveals its  striking 
similarities  to  the  Heideggerian  conception  of  conscience.  In  the  exploration  of  this 
resemblance the specific temporality of conscience is then made even more explicit. It must 
be remembered that we are not attempting to make something new of conscience by drawing 
this comparison, that it may be delimited from the other structures of Dasein, but rather to 
further  settle  the  phenomenon within  the  unity  of  Dasein  itself.  As  Heidegger  explains: 
“With regard to the fore-having of the whole of Dasein, which must necessarily be obtained, 
we must ask whether this being, as something existing, can become accessible at all in its 
being  a  whole.”  Once  conscience  is  more  firmly  established  as  temporal,  the  final 9
movement of this work will be to attempt a brief explanation of the specific temporality of 
discourse, that is found only in its infancy in Being and Time. Ultimately our ambition is to 
reveal the place and importance of conscience in Heidegger’s lifetime of work as a whole.  
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p227 (emphasis added)9
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Chapter 2 - Conscience and Discourse
§ 2 - DISCOURSE AND CARE
 In order to unpack the temporality of conscience we are tasked with the explication 
of an array of ideas all encapsulated within this single question. We are tasked at the least 
with  describing  the  specific  movement  of  conscience,  which  in  itself  is  nothing 
straightforward, but at the most with the burden of exploring the nature of time itself. In 
addition,  we  cannot  ignore  the  human  being  itself,  as  the  figure  that  sits  amidst  these 
phenomena. Thus, in order to restrict our question somewhat, and to ensure coherence in our 
answer, it will be necessary to remain close to Being and Time, and strictly not to stray too 
far from Heidegger’s argument therein. The overarching ambition of Heidegger in Being and 
Time was one of unification: to bring those disparate elements of philosophy and experience 
together such they could be understood in their relation. This unity became understandable 
by tracing the movement of Dasein to a singular and most primordial phenomenon: Care. 
Heidegger outlines that  “a primordial  coherence is  woven [within]  which constitutes the 
totality of the structural whole that we are seeking.”  This coherence is born of the very 10
concern that Dasein has for being, its own particular being and beings it encounters in the 
world.
Although  described  as  primordial  or  “basic”,  Heidegger  explains  that  the 
phenomenon of  care is  nevertheless “not  simple”.  In Being and Time,  care comes to be 
defined  as  “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-as-being-together-with”,  a  compound 
phrase that  speaks to the compound nature of  the phenomenon itself.  Care is  ultimately 
concluded to be expressed as “temporality”, and Dasein thus labelled as an occurrence, a 
being “of” time. As temporal, care expresses itself in a variety of distinct phenomena each of 
which have their own distinct temporality.  Of these, we must crucially understand three: 
Understanding  [Verstehen],  Attunement  [Befindlichkeit]  and  Discourse.  Understanding 
speaks to the “being-ahead-itself” of care, that is the futural aspect of concernful Dasein; its 
being concerned with its project as that which is not yet. Attunement in contrast speaks to the 
“already-being-in”  of  Dasein,  which  has  to  do  with  the  nature  of  Dasein  as  already 
“delivered over to” or “thrust into” a world, a history and a people. Both of these represent 
important features of the temporality of Dasein, which will be further outlined later in this 
exposition.  For  now  our  focus  will  settle  on  the  remaining  phenomenon:  discourse. 
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p18510
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Discourse has a specific character that is described by Heidegger as a “making present”, but 
this must not be confused with “the” present, a distinction that will also be made clear later 
on. Heidegger in his later works in particular will emphasise the role of discourse as having a 
“privileged constitutive function” for Dasein. The nature of this privilege is the starting point 
for our analysis.
The Greeks, and specifically Aristotle, identified the λόγος as that which comprised 
the fundamental determination of being human.  The human being was designated by them 11
as an animal endowed with reason (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον) later translated to be the “animal 
rationale”. Indeed to the Greeks, λόγος referred in part to the ability to use language, as the 
ability to speak, but more than this they saw it to represent the capacity to discover par 
excellence. Heidegger translates this definition of the human as “a living thing that has its 
genuine being-there in conversation and in discourse.”  His own initial position on the role 12
of  language  is  established  through  his  analysis  of  Aristotle,  and  this  is  outlined  in  his 
1921/22  lectures,  now  published  under  the  title  Phenomenological  Interpretations  of 
Aristotle. In this he writes:  
Insofar as they are objects of circumspection or indeed of that kind of understanding 
that in its autonomy simply looks at them, beings are addressed with respect to the 
way they look (εἰδῶ [idea, form]). The understanding that simply looks at beings 
explicates itself by addressing and discussing (λέγειν) these beings. The “what” of 
these objects that is addressed (λόγος  [discourse]) and their look (εἰδῶ) are in a 
sense the same. And this means that what is addressed in λόγος makes up as such 
these beings in the authentic sense. With the objects it addresses, λέγειν takes beings 
in the beingness (οὐσία [substance]) of their look into true safekeeping.13
What this passage elucidates is the visual orientation that Heidegger gives to his 
translation of Aristotle and his descriptions of knowledge. When we speak of “knowledge” 
in the setting of Being and Time we are simultaneously referring to the disclosing nature of 
Dasein, which refers also to truth [Wahrheit]. Heidegger equates these ideas roughly with the 
Greek  concept  of  ἀλήθεια.  Ἀλήθεια,  can  be  literally  translated  as  the  coming  out  of 
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concealment of being, the bringing into light or out of the shadows, out of hiding.  The term 14
is  a  negative  expression,  an  unconvering,  and  speaks  for  Heidegger  of  the  primordially 
concealing or distorting nature of existence and being in general, from which Dasein must 
“wrest” the truth and actively make being available. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes 
the way that Dasein uncovers its world as a bringing things into its “lumen naturale”, its 
clearing  [Lichtung],  within  which  its  world  is  illuminated.  This  making  transparent  or 15
making manifest, is in part to do with the movement of λόγος (or discourse) as that which 
makes something visible [δηλοῦν].
Discourse is  thus maintained by Heidegger as holding a privileged access to the 
entity,  that  is,  as a primordial  form of human life’s disclosedness.  Thus,  statements,  and 
language in general,  are considered an act  of discovery,  part  of  its  unveiling nature that 
Dasein sets in motion in its relationship with beings in general.  The function of language, 16
throughout Heidegger’s lifetime of work, goes on to be described in a variety of different 
ways including as “actualising”, “unfolding”, “gathering”, “safekeeping” to name a few. In 
Being and Time,  discourse is  defined as the articulation of  the intelligibility  of  being in 
general. Heidegger describes the process of coming into discourse as a type of collecting. He 
writes:  “Lego, legein,  Latin legere,  is  the same word as our lesen (to collect):  gleaning, 
collecting wood, harvesting grapes, making a selection; "reading (lesen) a book" is just a 
variant of "gathering" in the authentic sense.”  This gathering has the capacity to bring 17
beings into light, and the result is a certain power and “solidity” that Heidegger describes as 
an “emerging sway”,  a “constancy” of presence that  comes to be φύσις,  being as such. 
Ultimately, discourse involves a “letting the object “appear” for itself (middle voice) from 
out of itself and as it is in itself.”  Middle voice refers to a kind of verb form wherein the 18
subject  of  the  verb  cannot  be  categorised  as  either  agent  or  patient  specifically.  This  is 
reflective of  the description above,  wherein he makes explicit  that  the “understanding…
explicates itself.” As such, the kind of appearing made possible through discourse is a kind 
of coming forth that occurs as a result of a receptivity, not through any specific action of the 
object or subject involved in the bringing forth into unconcealment. However, as we can 
already  see,  the  unconcealment  specific  to  discourse  is  not  simple,  but  its  nature  is  of 
fundamental importance if we are to understand Heidegger's formulation of conscience.
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§ 3 - DISCOURSE AND THE PHENOMENON
“Phenomenon” comes from the Greek φαίνω which means “to bring into daylight” 
or “to place in brightness.” In Being and Time it is defined specifically as “what shows itself, 
the self-showing, the manifest.”  Dasein is a being that: “sees”; is “circumspect; “unveils”, 19
“uncovers and “brings to light”; it makes things “transparent”. This is not to say that Dasein 
uses its eyes to understand itself, but these words have been derived in many ways from the 
Greek ἀλήθεια by Heidegger. As McNeill outlines: “This apparent priority of vision, and its 
associated language, comes about not only (as Aristotle claims) because things appear to be 
most clearly delimited through vision, in terms of their outline, figure, or form, but also 
because  they  thereby  appear  most  constantly  present…only  vision  grants  the  possible 
apprehending  of  a  relative  constancy  of  presence,  even  while  allowing  for  change.”  20
Heidegger describes vision as a way of “holding” things in their presence, maintaining them 
in a state of being manifest.  What makes the λόγος (or discourse) distinct is that, despite 21
its nature as disclosing, the kind of determinacy attributed to the vision of ἀλήθεια is not 
necessarily characteristic of its movement. 
Strictly speaking, λόγος means “to let something be seen in its togetherness with 
something,  to  let  something  be  seen  as  something”  and  as  such  it  “acquires  with  this 
structure of synthesis the possibility of covering up.”  This synthetic aspect of λόγος, but 22
language in particular, has to do with the relational nature of language, particularly in the use 
of words a signifiers. As Coyne illustrates: “To give a sign is to reveal a totality in which 
various pieces of equipment have been assigned certain roles; to take something as a sign is 
to be led to this totality and to access it as a whole.”  In bringing beings into voice out of the 23
collecting aspect of discourse, that is applying to them a sign, Dasein is already involved in 
the opportunity for concealment. Thus, those that listen to what is spoken about in discourse 
“do not seize it as a unity, whether they have not yet heard or have already heard…do not get 
through to λόγος, even if they try to do so with words, ἔπεα.”24
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Dasein is usually and maintained in the mode of being together-with innerworldly 
beings. In this world of beings Dasein also uncovers beings like itself, that have a specific 
effect on the Dasein and the nature of the interaction that occurs. This “being-with” others 
has the effect of bringing Dasein into the use of language, something that it is inherently 
familiar with in some way, as a result of a fundamental capacity that is discourse. Bringing 
into statement carries with it  the possibility of covering up of the truth of being, as that 
which is said can be lost in misinterpretation, a covering up of disclosure made possible by 
its reliance on signification. Uncovering is no longer simply a matter of looking, as things 
can “show themselves as they are not in themselves” and only as they “seem” to be.  As a 25
being always to do with other beings like it, Dasein is always already discovering its world 
in a way that is related to others or influenced by others. Essentially, Dasein uncovers its 
world with “their” perspective as a kind of visor that determines its vision in a particular 
way. Heidegger explains that “factical life not only takes itself up and cares for itself as a 
significant  occurrence  standing  before  it  and  as  worldly  importance  but  also  speaks  the 
language of the world whenever speaking about itself.”  The question for  Heidegger is 26
whether,  therefore,  Dasein  is  always  relegated  to  a  vision  affected  by  partial  or  even 
complete concealment in its interaction with its world and itself. Is there a way of being of 
Dasein that might allow it to discourse in a different way, in order to uncover its world, and 
itself, in its primordial truth?
§ 4 - THE TRUTH OF BEING - THE POSSIBILITY OF 
AUTHENTICITY
The great difficulty for Heidegger is to identify and describe an access to that being 
that is always already involved with its own concealment in some way. Dasein is itself that 
which discloses; it is its disclosedness. As such, it is always already involved in uncovering 
its world and its self simultaneously. Heidegger explains that essentially Dasein is its world, 
and is thus thrown into and entangled in a world and itself from the outset. Dasein is defined 
in  Being and Time  as  a  being that  constantly  evades  itself,  unique in  the  fact  that  it  is 
concerned with its being in its very being, but simultaneously ineluctably enigmatic, evading 
its own disclosure. Dasein turns away from itself, concerned about facing the ever looming 
anxiety [Angst] and uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] natural to it, instead tranquilising itself in 
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the every day talk of others. It, even from the outset, is accustomed to understanding itself 
from the soothing perspective of others, rather than the uncomfortable position of its own 
natural truth. The exact nature of this anxiety is complex, and explained more fully later on. 
Regardless, in turning away from itself Dasein is “buried over” in its being. Dasein could be 
said to “mishear” itself, but as Heidegger states: “A definite kind of being of Dasein lies in 
every failure to hear the call or in a mishearing of oneself” .  27
Heidegger, in his earlier works, has already established that this mishearing is itself a 
positive phenomenon. This “claiming” to show itself  might in fact be the only way that 
anything is available to us at all, and this type of showing is particularly pertinent to Dasein, 
as something that does not show itself.  He writes: “An object that is always seen only in 28
semi-darkness  can  be  correctly  understood  in  its  semi-dark  givenness  only  by  a  detour 
passing through an overly clear elucidation of it.”  As a negative term, Dasein’s primordial 29
capacity of ἀλήθεια in a sense presupposes a prior concealment (λήθη). We must here also 
take note of the greek term κρύπτεσθαι, again a middle voice term that describes the hiding 
of oneself that is natural to Dasein and its world. We can relate this term to Heraclitus, who 
famously states that "Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ”, that nature is accustomed, or indeed loves, 
to be covered over.  Heidegger explains that “what remains concealed in an exceptional 30
sense…is not this or that being but rather…the being of beings.”  The hiding is primordial 31
to being, in the sense that it is the simultaneous quality necessary for the coming into light of 
disclosure. Although many of these ideas are not brought into discussion until Heidegger’s 
much later works, what is clear even in Being and Time is that this “covering up” of being to 
Dasein, and therefore itself, is an inherent component of the movement of Dasein. But are 
we, in establishing this, any closer to identifying the manner of access of Dasein to itself? 
Heidegger answers: 
“Life is difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being, not in the sense of a 
contingent feature. If it is the case that factical life authentically is what it is in this 
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being-hard and being-difficult, then the genuinely fitting way of gaining access to it 
and truly safekeeping it can only consist in making itself hard for itself.”32
The technique of phenomenology that Heidegger utilises is described expressly as 
that which runs counter to covering up. The bewildering process of showing or unveiling that 
which is involved with and in essence the very covering over of that which it is, is a process 
he simply cannot explain fully in Being and Time. However, due to its attribute of potentially 
covering up as  it  discloses,  discourse  becomes of  new interest.  It  is  important  to  make 
explicit here that discourse is not always a linguistic communication between Dasein and 
others. It is not simply “words”, but rather an attunement-with or understanding-with that 
communicates.  Discourse  is  an  articulation  of  some  intelligibility,  not  necessarily  made 
explicit, but possibly expressed in a variety of different ways including, importantly, silence. 
Linguistic communication is only one type of discourse, and is related to a form of discourse 
Heidegger  labels  as  signs  [Zeichen]:   “an  item  of  equipment  whose  specific  character 
consists  in  showing  or  indicating.”  Early  in  Division  One,  testimony  [Zeugnis]  is 33
distinguished  from  these  signs.  The  act  of  testifying  is  an  expression  of  oneself 
“primordially,  unaffected by any theoretical interpretation and without aiming to propose 
any.”  As Coyne remarks: “Testimony in this sense has a disclosive capacity analogous to 34
that of signs. But rather than illuminating a totality of equipment, testimony consists in the 
self-expression that lights up the totality of Dasein’s Being…unlike the sign, attestation is 
identical with what it discloses.”  The mode of access of Dasein to itself comes by way of a 35
special form of this attestation [Bezeugung].
In brief summary, in being-with others, Dasein discourses in a mode that conceals its 
world and itself; existing and understanding itself with this distorted eye. The “they” silently 
disburdens Dasein of not only that which is present to it, but those choices that it might make 
of itself and its world: its possibilities. This is Dasein in inauthenticity. In order to be given 
the choice over its project, to be authentic, Dasein must reveal itself as itself in the midst of 
that into which it is thrown. Dasein can not lift itself out of its world to do so, instead, Dasein 
must  make itself  transparent  to itself  and notice itself  in its  inauthentic movement.  This 
revelation cannot be clear and simple, as Dasein is none of these things itself, but equally 
 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle, p11332
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that  which  is  uncovered  must  be  “true”.  Heidegger  resolves  that  Dasein  can  find itself, 
through a particular phenomenon classified as an attestation, that he labels as conscience. 
Conscience,  as  attestation,  discloses.  It  gives  Dasein  something  to  understand: 
specifically the possibility of taking over its own thrown ground. As something that conveys 
its  specific  kind  of  “information”  in  the  manner  unique  to  attestation,  it  is  labelled  by 
Heidegger as a call [Ruf], that summons [anruft] Dasein to itself. It is important to be clear 
that,  to  Heidegger:  “We  are  not  comparing  this  phenomenon  with  a  call,  but  we  are 
understanding it as discourse, in terms of the disclosedness of Dasein.”  In simultaneity, 36
Heidegger describes the movement of conscience as a call, yet distances it from anything 
like a call as the term is commonly used. The distinction Heidegger is trying to maintain is 
that the call is nothing like a communication from one Dasein to another, not a sign. It calls 
Dasein to something, but what it finds is nothing that can come into words. Thus, the call is 
ultimately “silent”. 
Heidegger  has  already established in  Being and Time that  discourse can express 
itself in silence. He writes: “The person who is silent can “let something be understood,” that 
is, one can develop an understanding more authentically than the person who never runs out 
of words…One who is mute still has the tendency to “speak”.”  As established prior, there 37
is an understanding that comes before anything like speech, primordial to language. The seat 
of this capacity is in a listening. Heidegger states that: “Listening to...is the existential being-
open of Dasein as being-with for the other.”  In listening, as open, Dasein is thrown into 38
that  to  which  it  listens.  Listening  does  not  here  refer  to  acoustic  perception,  but  like 
language, is to do with the primordial capacity of discourse. Heidegger distinguishes a kind 
of “listening along to” of day-to-day communication from the more primordial hearing that 
he labels as hearkening [horchen],  a hearing that understands. Heidegger writes: “human 
beings do hear, and they hear words, but in this hearing they cannot "hearken" to—that is, 
follow—what is not audible like words, what is not talk but λόγος.”  Specifically, “listening 39
even constitutes the primary and authentic openness of Dasein for its ownmost potentiality 
of being.”  Thus, Heidegger establishes that the mode of access of Dasein to itself is by way 40
of this special kind of listening. The difficulty with this is that Dasein can only hear truly 
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when it is already hearkening, and thus hearing must be “intrinsically directed” in advance 
toward Being.41
How, then, is Dasein to grasp its being from out of this self-propagating entangling 
darkness? The question becomes one of receptivity, a kind of making oneself available to 
hear the call of conscience, in advance. This is not to say that one prepares for the call, hears 
it,  and  then  finds  itself,  in  a  kind  of  sequence  of  events.  Instead,  hearing  the  call  of 
conscience is synonymous with this preparation. The being ready for the call is in fact the 
hearing of it, and the change in enactment of existence, that is the change to a movement as 
authentic, is the result of this making ready of Dasein. The hearkening for conscience, is 
conscience. It is not a discussion between parties, nothing like a conversation in which one 
calls and one listens. Instead its movement finds its basis in the very facet of Dasein from 
which it springs, that is discourse. The “listening out” of Dasein has to do with an awaiting 
or expecting of a certain possibility for being. We must recall that the being of Dasein is 
defined  as  “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-as-being-together-with”,  and  the 
revelation of this being is in a sense a revelation of its possibility. Dasein is not brought forth 
as something objectively present, not as something to be communicated, but rather as the 
very ungraspable movement that it is. Brogan makes such a reading of conscience explicit in 
his  essay Listening to the Silence: Reticence and the Call  of  Conscience in Heidegger’s 
Philosophy. 
In Brogan’s reading of conscience, the preparation of Dasein for the call is bound up 
with  a  readiness  for  death.  He  draws  our  attention  to  a  passage  in  Being  and  Time: 
“Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself up, 
and thus it shatters all one’s clinging to whatever existence one has reached.”  It is death 42
that allows Dasein the opportunity to separate itself from its coverings in the world of being-
with, to which it clings. Heidegger explains that: “In anticipating the indefinite certainty of 
death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising from its own there. Being-towards-the-
end must hold itself in this very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to 
cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty.”  Thus, anticipation allows an opportunity for 43
Dasein to reveal its lostness, by providing it with a perspective that is free of the coverings of 
the  they,  and  instead  capable  of  being  itself  in  “passionate  [leidenschaftlichen]  anxious 
freedom toward death.”  These concepts of death and anxiety will be dealt with in greater 44
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detail in further chapters. For now our task is to make explicit that for Dasein, uncovering 
itself is a shattering and disturbing experience. 
Brogan makes clear that the choice to confront itself is not an easy one, as Dasein 
has a predilection for turning away from itself even when its self has been revealed. Thus, 
Dasein must make a choice “ahead of time”, and remain resolute in the decision if it is to 
succeed. However, this “choosing to choose…is not an actual choice in the specific sense of 
choosing this or that thing. It is rather a matter of recovering our capacity for choosing.”  In 45
making this choice, Dasein is not choosing to hear the call of conscience, but wanting to 
have a conscience and standing ready for it as “resolutely prepared”. Dasein cannot seek 
conscience as something that can be looked for but, as prepared, Dasein is receptive to itself 
in a particular way. What conscience represents is a kind of noticing made possible by the 
preparation, in which Dasein realises itself as not being itself, and is “called" to understand 
itself as itself in its there-ness, in its thrownness.  Ultimately, being receptive to the call and 46
itself  is  the way that  conscience is  heard by Dasein.  Brogan explains:  “Another  way of 
saying this is to say that understanding the call is a matter of holding ourselves ready for and 
open to the call. The call of conscience can only be heard in holding ourselves out towards 
having a conscience as a possibility for being. That is, as was said earlier, “it is a matter of 
choosing to have a conscience, wanting to have a conscience rather than possessing it.””  47
§ 5 - THE CONFUSION OF CONSCIENCE
The  question  that  the  essay  aims  to  now raise  is  of  the  appropriateness  of  the 
language  that  Heidegger  chooses  to  describe  the  movement  of  conscience.  Conscience 
[Gewissen] is a term in English and German both that carries with it a dense and complex 
history. The conscience described by Heidegger in Being and Time is explicitly distanced 
from any historical conception of conscience, as a voice or command. The conscience that 
we are familiar with in common usage is explored in the following chapter, but the point that 
must  be  made  here  is  that  in  choosing  the  term conscience,  Heidegger  is  attaching  his 
interpretation  to  a  considerable  philosophical  baggage.  In  his  footnotes  in  Chapter  56, 
Heiedegger situates his analysis within a wider debate about the nature and evolution of 
conscience throughout  pagan and Christian history.  Such a manoeuvre has the effect  of, 
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perhaps unnecessarily, entwining his argument within a great deal of conceptual unclarity. 
Many theories already exist as to why Heidegger may have chosen this path. Some propose 
that Heidegger’s attempt is to ground the common or historical interpretations of conscience 
in  a  phenomenological  approach,  and  thus  to  incorporate  conscience  within  the  overall 
activity of Being and Time as a destructive process. What this essay proposes is that in fact 
the decision to utilise the language of conscience is far more complex than this, and involves 
the  evolution  of  Heidegger’s  own  thinking  through  a  wide  variety  of  philosophical 
influences. 
Schalow in his book Quest for the Sacred, attempts to situate Heidegger’s argument 
within  a  Christian  context.  This  move  is  not  unreasonable  in  light  of  Heidegger's  early 
theological  works  and his  extensive  references  to  other  Christian  philosophers  including 
Kant, Kierkegaard and Eckhart to name a few. Schalow makes the argument that Heidegger, 
"having been struck by Eckhart's enigmatic fusing of the logos with the soul's innermost 
responsiveness as  the "little  spark" of  conscience,  Heidegger  had discovered the path to 
describe conscience in phenomenological terms, namely, as the silent call of care.”  Such a 48
position is based upon the assumption that Eckhart’s work on the idea of silence was a major 
influence on Heidegger’s particular emphasis of listening as a ground for the meaning of 
being. Ekhart’s sermons make reference to a the role of silence in man: "First we will take 
the words: 'In the midst of silence there was spoken within me a secret word’…Yet in that 
ground [of the soul] is the silent ‘middle’"  The silent middle here is linked by Schalow to 49
the “soundlessness of uncanniness” and the “stillness” of the Dasein that is called and calling 
in  the  movement  of  conscience.  Schalow ultimately  comes  to  argue  that  “Heidegger’s 50
description of conscience retrieves primal Christianity as the attempt to locate the abysmal 
character of the self in the silence of language.”  Such an argument is of tremendous interest 51
from the theological perspective, but the “little spark” of the soul to which Ekhart refers 
carries little that would be capable of being situated into the greater argument of Being and 
Time. Thus, the theological aspect of conscience does little to clarify its nature in Being and 
Time,  especially given that Heidegger actively and quite radically distances himself from 
these interpretations.
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However, to exclude any theological influence on Heidegger’s thought (particularly 
in respect to conscience) is naive, as Heidegger himself is clearly conscious of and interested 
in the content of theology, albeit ultimately from a primarily phenomenological perspective. 
Much of the language Heidegger attaches to his conscience is manifestly theological, from 
the use of attestation, witness, announcement and even λόγος itself. Logos, in the Christian 
world was almost explicitly the word of one being alone, that is God. It came to be the word 
of Jesus Christ in his coming, and this itself transformed the idea of the internal mind and 
voice of man. Heidegger himself notes that to the Christian: “the announcement of the Cross 
is Christ Himself; He is the logos of salvation, of eternal life, ‘logos zoes’.”  Schalow poses 52
that one might overlook the religious side to Heidegger's analysis of conscience, because in 
Being and Time it appears to include a link to φρόνησῐς and action that is situated firmly 
within  Heidegger’s  analysis  of  Aristotle  around  this  time.  However,  to  overlook  the 53
complex interplay between Heidegger’s analysis of the Greeks, in particular Aristotle and 
Plato, and Paul with whom he is grappling in the lead up to writing Being and Time, is to 
simplify his analysis of conscience too far.  In truth,  to Heidegger,  these schools are not 
disparate, but represent a continuum of humanity’s attempt to grapple with the nature of 
existence. Heidegger explains: “Heraclitus’s teaching on logos is taken as a predecessor of 
the logos mentioned in the New Testament, in the prologue to the Gospel of John. The logos 
is Christ. Now because Heraclitus already speaks of the logos, the Greeks arrived at the very 
doorstep of absolute truth—namely, the revealed truth of Christianity.”  54
What should be clear from the analysis above is that when we speak of conscience 
as it appears in Being and Time we are not describing something straightforward nor easily 
situated into the history of the term. This difficulty raises the possibility of conscience falling 
away into, or at least seeming to stand in, obscurity. As obscured in this way, conscience lies 
in apparent disconnect from those other ideas found more strongly unified in Being and 
Time. The nature of listening as preparation blurs the boundaries between the concepts of 
discourse and time, and makes little sense in the setting of the common historical usages of 
these terms. This essay will thus seek to clarify the nature of conscience, such that it can be 
more robustly situated within the greater argument of Being and Time. In order to do so it 
must attempt to unravel the way Heidegger’s ideas may have developed. This process will 
rely heavily on the interconnections made visible in the language used by Heidegger, but 
also on his descriptions of the movement of Dasein in general, in his explications prior to 
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Being and Time. Ultimately, the purpose of the essay will be to situate the listening specific 
to conscience within the source of the unity of Being and Time itself, that is the temporality 
of Dasein as care.
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Chapter 3 - Redefining the Vulgar
§ 6 - THE VULGAR VERSUS THE EXISTENTIAL
 In the last chapter we established the specific relationship of Heidegger’s conception 
of conscience with the primordial phenomenon of Dasein that is its capacity for discourse. 
This delivered us to a phenomenon specifically without content, a silent call, that has to do 
entirely with a listening and not at all to do with a vocal or linguistic expression. This 
characterisation is so vastly different to the idea of conscience familiar to the western world, 
that it seems in many ways to be describing something entirely new. The novelty of 
Heidegger’s conscience is made even more intriguing by the fact that the term vanishes 
entirely from his writings after Being and Time, despite the pivotal role it plays in the arc of 
this text. Heidegger himself distinguishes his formulation from the historical, labelling his 
own as an “existential interpretation” and the more familiar as the “vulgar interpretations”. 
He recognises that the two conceptions are not obviously correlated:  
“Conscience is a call of care from the uncanniness of being-in-the-world that 
summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-guilty. We showed that 
wanting-to-have-a-conscience corresponded to understanding the summons. Both of 
these characterisations are not immediately harmonious with the vulgar 
interpretation of conscience.”  55
 The primary question we wish to address in this chapter is whether these 
interpretations share anything fundamental at all, and secondary to this, why Heidegger has 
chosen this language to describe a phenomenon that shares so little with its namesakes. In 
order to answer these questions we must turn to Heidegger’s analysis of the “vulgar” 
interpretations, in an attempt to unravel the tendrils that intertwine the two conceptions. In so 
doing, we hope to elucidate the passage along which Heidegger’s own thought may have 
developed, to the point that it emerges in Being and Time. Any analysis of conscience cannot 
ignore those conceptions found throughout the history of Christianity, but also it 
etymological ties to the ancient Greek. As aforementioned, in his footnote to chapter 56 
Heidegger himself makes reference M. Kahler, A. Ritschl and H.G. Stoker, individuals who 
had attempted to trace the etymology of Gewissen. In addition to these, we will draw 
reference specifically from the works of P. Bosman, P. Sorabji and P. Strohm, who each 
undertake a similar historical analysis of the word and its meanings and derivations.  
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p27755
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§ 7 - THE ETYMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE
Heidegger’s use of language, particularly in Being and Time, is unique. The ideas he 
attempts to explicate are steeped in history which opens them to misinterpretation. As such, 
his use of language relies on a precision, but also a “plurivocity” of terms, which in a sense 
allows him to secure his ideas within the annals of human thought, but equally to give them a 
freedom from the tethers of the history of philosophy that threaten to level them down. To 
Heidegger, philosophical “understanding” consists not merely in taking up the past in order 
to accrue knowledge, but rather in repeating in an original manner what is understood in the 
past, in terms of and for the sake of one’s very own situation. The pursuing of the various 
directions  in  the  meaning  and  uses  of  a  word  is  the  potential  means  of  reaching  the 
respective object meant in each use. He writes: “Such a focus on plurivocity [that which is 
said in many ways] is not a mere poking around in the meanings of isolated words but rather 
an expression of a radical tendency to gain access to the meant objects themselves and to 
make available the motivational source of the different ways they are meant.”  Heidegger 56
utilises the term conscience [Gewissen] despite its complex history, and we must assume 
given the care and attention he gives to linguistic expression in the rest of Being and Time 
that  this  is  purposeful.  Given the  vast  array of  uses  and meanings  of  this  term through 
history, the question we must answer is to “what” Heidegger is pointing in his use of it, and 
perhaps more importantly, to “whom”.
To begin, we must remind ourselves that although this analysis and much of the 
secondary  literature  is  written  in  English,  and  based  upon  English  translations,  that 
Heidegger himself wrote in German. Thus, as we seek to derive the historical divisions of 
conscience  we  must  delineate  between  the  English  term  “conscience”  and  the  German 
Gewissen. Thankfully, as we will see, both words share a similar lineage and carry with them 
a  great  deal  of  common  associations.  For  now  we  will  trace  the  origins  of  Gewissen 
alongside “conscience”, differentiating them only when such a distinction reveals itself to be 
significant. Gewissen importantly perhaps, has gewiss [certain] as one of its derivatives and 
hence  implies  a  way  of  becoming-certain  [Gewisswerden].  In  this  way  Gewissen  has 
semantic ties that distinguishes it from “conscience”. Here we should also take note of the 
relationship  between  “conscience”  and  the  term  “consciousness”.  These  terms  were 
indivisible concepts in English until the 17th century, and likely represent an attribution of 
Eastern thought to the Western vocabulary.  In French, conscience can be directly translated 57
to either of these English terms, only to be delineated by the context of its use, adding further 
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to the complexity. We do not see a similar word to consciousness, however, emerging from 
the German Gewissen.  Thus,  the Heideggerian conscience,  although to do with our very 
selves, cannot be simply relegated to a reformulation of consciousness.
Consensus  is  that  “conscience”  first  finds  its  roots  in  the  Greek  σύνοιδα  word 
group. As a verb, this root is expressed in various forms from the 6th Century BCE. Its Latin 
cousin  conscientia,  seemingly  shares  more  with  the  English  term than  the  German,  but 
etymologically it is also an offspring, rather than a cousin, of this σύνοιδα group of words. 
Bosman  writes:  “the  derivatives  in  Western  Languages  are,  via  Latin,  morphologically 
dependent on the Greek forms…[but] the dependence reaches beyond morphology to include 
conceptuality.”  Σύνοιδα  is  utilised initially as a verb, as an activity undertaken by the 58
individual. Loosely it can be translated as ‘to be conscious of’, as σύνοιδα was utilised in 
the context of being conscious of something or someone. Σύνοιδα and its derivations are 
composite verbs and can be broken into two components. First, “σύν-“ taken alone strictly 
means “with”, and when taken into a composite means “any kind of union, connection or 
participation with a thing.”  The root word “-οιδα” is itself the perfect indicative active 59
form of the verb εἰδῶ, which roughly translates as “to know” or “to understand”. εἰδῶ is 
closely related to the word εἶδος which refers to that which is seen: form, shape. Essentially, 
the originary conscience was a capacity to see an idea, an understanding, that one shares 
with others. 
Rather  paradoxically,  what  was  delineated  as  a  sharing  of  understanding  with 
another, σύνοιδα and its derivatives can take a reflexive, as well as a non-reflexive form: the 
subject can “know with” another (non-reflexive), or simply with one’s self (reflexive). But 
how does the latter differ from simply knowing by oneself? If we take the non-reflexive 
form, one might say for instance that: “I know with others that the sky is blue.” This kind of 
knowledge is shared directly with others as something that both parties can and do explicitly 
know.  The  meaning  of  the  reflexive  form is  less  clear.  In  his  apology,  Plato’s  Socrates 
famously  states:  ἐγὼ  γὰρ  δὴ  οὔτε  μέγα  οὔτε  σμικρὸν  σύνοιδα  ἐμαυτῷσοφὸς  ὤν.  60
Roughly translated this means: “For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little.” 
This use of the reflexive term raises an important question about the nature of the ancient 
conscience. Does Socrates know of himself that which others also know: that he is not wise? 
Or does Socrates know with himself that he is not wise? The reflexive verb in this setting 
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would  imply  that  indeed  he  is  knowing  this  ‘with’ himself,  but  this  implies  a  sense  of 
division or separation within Socrates. 
We are alerted here to the Socratic δαίμων, his kind of guiding spirit, a conception 
of which can be traced back as far as Heraclitus. The δαίμων of Socrates and Heraclitus has 
specifically no relation to the σύνοιδα word group. In his famous Fragment 119, Heraclitus 
remarks: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων [Man’s character is his daimon] . In this setting, δαίμων 61
is often translated as fate, rather than an internal spirit or being, to which it is translated more 
often  in  modernity.  Martin  Kähler,  establishes  in  his  vital  work  Das  Gewissen  that  the 
δαίμων  only  has  bearing on what  Socrates  considered to  be  a  very  personal  calling  as 
philosopher.  To attempt an explication of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, but 62
what is clear is that the “with-ness” of conscience is extremely complex, and at odds with 
Heidegger’s formulation. Heidegger describes his call as one from Dasein to Dasein, the 
implication being a kind of division within Dasein that allows this phenomenon to occur. But 
we must recall that for Heidegger Dasein is always and necessarily a whole, and this unity of 
Dasein as care does not permit of division in such a way. Such a division is more reminiscent 
of  Dasein  in  inauthenticity,  when it  is  dispersed,  lost  and entangled in  the  “they”.  This 
dichotomy elucidates a clear difficulty that exists in Heidegger’s use of the term conscience, 
even at a most basic and fundamental level. Dasein is not “with” itself in any explicit sense 
in Being and Time,  and the implication that it is in many ways draws the reader into an 
interpretation  of  the  phenomenon  that  leads  us  away  from  understanding  of  Dasein  as 
unified.
It is not until much later in history, in the first Century BCE, that the substantive 
form of  the σύνοιδα  group of  words emerges,  that  is:  συνείδος.  It  was in the works 63
especially of Paul and Philo, in the first Century BCE, that this form came into its own, and 
perhaps  along  with  a  shift  in  its  meaning.  However,  there  was  some  evidence  of  its 
beginning to emerge much earlier than this in the writings of Demosthenes, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus and Diodorus Siculus. These usages of συνείδος  were sporadic, appearing 
around ten times in over three centuries in writings available today. Many current scholars 
agree  that  the  substantive  form  may  have  come  into  being  in  colloquial  use.  This  is 
substantiated by its somewhat sudden appearance in the first century BCE. The letters of 
Paul seem to assume the reader is fully aware of the conception, and his use holds many 
 Heraclitus, Fragment 119 in Heraclitus: Fragments, Trans. T. Robinson (Toronto, University of  Toronto 61
Press, 1987) p69
 Martin Kähler, Das Gewissen: Ethische Untersuchung. Die Entwicklung seiner Namen und seines Begriffes, 62
(Nachdruck, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1967[1878])
 Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul, p5063
!  Conscience and Time24
meanings as given without need for explanation. Essentially, what we see historically is a 
gradual migration from the pagan use of conscience as something close to self-knowledge 
into a broader, more complex and evinced concept. Conscience transformed from a verb, a 
simply mental action that one happened to be capable of performing, into something of an 
entity, a necessary human experience that became delineated from other mental faculties in a 
very significant, but decidedly non-specific way. It is also here that the “otherly” character of 
conscience is made distinct, as an entity and no longer a capacity of the human. This division 
is held within the concept of conscience through its evolution, particularly into the Christian 
conception, where conscience is defined as the voice of God.
Eckstein,  undoubtedly  an  important  influence  on  Heidegger’s  religious  thinking, 
brings substance to conscience as a means for understanding its various features. From the 
time  of  evolution  of  the  substantive  form  of  συνείδος  through  to  its  usage  in  Paul, 
conscience holds a character of substance, and Eckstein interprets this as the presence of 
some kind of inner entity evidenced by the call. This entity has the capacity to judge, control 
and make aware. To Eckstein, such a formulation does not induce a change to conscience 
itself, but allows a rejuvenation of that moral-religious consciousness that is limited when 
one attempts to simplify conscience into a descriptive term. This explains, in part, why the 
substantive form may have resonated so deeply with Paul, as illustrated by his writings and 
use of the term. However, as an entity distinct from Dasein, conscience is again distanced 
from its unity that was made possible through care. Heidegger makes it clear that such a 
reading is not in accordance with his own, as Dasein does not encounter itself as something 
objectively present, and it is not that case that we are justified in looking for the caller of 
conscience outside  of  Dasein.  Vitally,  conscience is  never  made explicit  in  the  call  as 64
separate or complete in itself, but “remains in a striking indefiniteness” in its very nature.  65
This  indefiniteness,  as  we  will  see,  is  a  vital  component  of  Heidegger’s  formulation. 
Regardless, one thing now is clear and that is that an examination of the various historical 
formulations of conscience seems to bring confusion rather than clarity to the phenomenon 
as we find it described in Being and Time.
§ 8 - THE GUILTY CONSCIENCE
Other  early  examples  of  the  use  of  the  σύνοιδα  group  are  more  commonly 
descriptions of a kind of “knowledge”. Early in its use the σύνοιδα group is found also in 
affirmative statements, or statements lacking value judgements. For example, in Plato we 
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find Alcibiades exclaim: καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν σύνοιδ ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι εἰ ἐθέλοιμι παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα 
[Even now I am still conscious that if I consented to lend him my ear].  Bosman goes as far 66
as to say that: “the content of the knowledge shared with the self can be divergent as the 
content of any other kind of knowledge.”  This said, conscience of something wrong or 67
lacking in the individual is certainly the more common usage of the ancient term, especially 
as it evolves throughout the following centuries to involve a sense of moral insufficiency. 
This idea of a ‘guilty conscience’ becomes, in the Christian tradition, the primary (if not the 
exclusive) sense of the term. Heidegger is certainly aware of this, and purports his task in 
Being and Time to be to reveal this ‘guilt’ as an existential, fundamental trait of Dasein, not 
something applied to it from some place external but coming into being necessarily from 
Dasein itself. 
As aforementioned, Heidegger makes reference to the works of Martin Kähler in his 
description  of  conscience.  Kähler  writes  specifically  in  support  of  the  conception  of 
conscience in primarily moral terms. To him, σύνοιδα is not primarily a knowing something 
of oneself, but rather a judging of one’s conduct in a moral sense. In many ways, Kähler has 
assumed a role for guilt in conscience and read it into his etymological examination. The 
term  ‘guilt’,  shares  issue  in  the  moral  realm  with  the  legal.  The  Latin  offspring  term 
conscientia, was championed by Cicero, who is by far the most prolific author on this topic 
in the Latin language, mentioning the idea 77 times in his surviving writings. He writes: 
“There is indeed a true law, right reason [recta ratio], agreeing with nature, diffused among 
all,  unchanging,  everlasting,  which calls  to  duty by commanding,  deters  from wrong by 
forbidding; which, however, neither commands nor forbids the good in vain, nor affects the 
wicked by commanding or forbidding.”  The legal sense of guilt, as the transgression of a 68
specific law, is directly opposed to Heidegger’s formulation which is something impossible 
to be shared. Further, conscientia is more often than σύνοιδα associated with terms such a 
bona, praeclara or even optima and is therefore not at all bound up with guilt necessarily. 
The description of guilt that we find in Being and Time is deliberately distanced from this 
formulation.
Heidegger  defines  guilt  as  something  necessarily  non-relational,  that  is  not 
dependent on a shared judgement between Dasein and others. The common “guilt” outlined 
above is instead based on a primary indebtedness,  made possible only on the basis of a 
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primordial being guilty. This primordial guilt has to do with the temporality of Dasein, and 
specifically with its character as a “not-yet”. Dasein, as a result of its “understanding” nature, 
exists as that which it is not yet, the interpretation of which is grounded always in that which 
it already is. As always already thrown, Dasein is “never to gain power over one’s ownmost 
being from the ground up.”  Dasein can be its own ground but can never get “behind itself” 69
and  gain  power  over  its  ground,  beyond  its  capacity  to  throw  itself  into  itself  and  its 
situation. Such a description ultimately does little to assuage our confusion, and leaves open 
far more questions about the “dialectic of negation” to which Heidegger professes that it 
points.  Such  an  undertaking  is  far  beyond  the  scope  of  this  piece.  Instead,  what  this 
discussion  reveals  to  us  is  the  importance  to  Heidegger  of  grounding  guilt  within  the 
movement  of  Dasein  as  temporal,  and  ultimately  into  the  unity  of  Dasein  as  care.  The 
introduction of the terms guilt and conscience into the temporal unity of the whole of Being 
and Time certainly is interesting, but in doing so Heidegger is opening his argument to a 
obfuscation and semantic complexity that requires an extensive justification, that could have 
been possibly avoided with the use of different language. 
§ 10 - CONSCIENCE IN PAUL THE APOSTLE
Any discussion of the concept of Christian conscience cannot help but come back to 
Paul.  Of  all  the  biblical  writers,  Paul  mentions  conscience  the  most,  with  21  separate 
references throughout his works. Kähler aligns Paul’s use with what he categorises as an 
“anthropoligical" use of the term, and distances it  from anything like the “vox dei” with 
which it later comes into line. His determination of conscience aligns more closely with the 
Latin conscientia as a substantive internal judge of moral actions. However, given that Paul 
authored his letters in Greek, and exclusively used the term συνείδησις, we can already see 
the way the concept has become complicated. Heidegger, as we will later see, looks in great 
detail at Paul’s writings in his early philosophical life, but in this work places very little 
emphasis on an investigation of conscience. The reason for this is unclear, but interestingly 
much of  the  language  Heidegger  uses  in  his  description  of  conscience  is  echoed in  his 
analysis of Paul. To Paul, conscience is something that each individual has of their own; he 
describes “my conscience”, “your conscience”, “conscience of another” and “conscience by 
every speaker.” Paul writes: “Any man who is an unbeliever, or who takes no part in your 
ministrations,  should enter  the place of meeting,  he is  convicted in conscience by every 
speaker, he feels himself judged by all.”  Paulian conscience displays that marked obscurity 70
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as to the nature of its “shared-ness”, as a phenomenon shared both with others and the self 
simultaneously. 
Regardless, Paul’s conscience is clearly something with which the individual must 
contend, as something that follows along or “bears witness” to the conduct of the individual, 
gives testament and as such condemns the individual in their actions. Paul writes: “For when 
the Gentiles, having not the Law, do by nature the works of the Law…since they manifest 
the work of the Law written in their hearts; while their conscience also bears its witness, and 
their inward thoughts answering one to the other, accuse, or else defend them.”  Sorabji 71
describes Paulian conscience as something that co-witnesses (symmartyrei).  It is not the 72
case that  conscience is  the unwavering law itself,  but rather it  is  that  which reveals our 
possession of it in our hearts. From his earliest study with Carl Braig, as Ott points out, 
Heidegger was alert to the phenomenon of conscienta as “self-awareness", as the birth of 
self-understanding which reflects the uniqueness of one's relation to God.  The purpose of 73
this analysis is not to be exhaustive, but instead simply to make clear that, as with the ancient 
Greek  conception,  very  little  correlation  can  be  found  between  Paul’s  interpretation  of 
conscience and Heidegger’s, beyond some of the language he uses in their description. 
We  might  thus  think  to  seek  out  answers  in  thinkers  more  contemporary  to 
Heidegger  to  substantiate  his  use  of  the  term.  Heidegger  himself  examines  a  myriad  of 
thinkers  who  bring  this  idea  into  discussion.  Heidegger’s  commentary  on  the  works  of 
Jerome  and  Aquinas,  and  their  descriptions  of  conscience,  bears  little  resemblance  to 
Heidegger’s  description  in  Being  and  Time.  Heidegger  himself  in  The  Concept  of  Time 
makes  note  of  Yorck’s  conception,  but  this  is  described  in  a  way  radically  opposed  to 
Heidegger’s,  as  something  that  can  come  into  “total  externalisation”.  We  may  seek 74
clarification  in  the  moralistic-idealistic  formulations  of  exponents  like  Kant,  Hegel  and 
Hartmann but this brings us no closer. In many ways the closest we come to Heidegger’s 
formulation is in the naturalistic and sociological theories of conscience, such as those of 
Darwin,  Nietzsche  and  particularly  Freud.  Ultimately,  however,  this  mode  of  analysis 75
brings us into greater confusion rather than clarity. 
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In  many  ways  the  issue  we  have  uncovered  speaks  to  our  earlier  discussion  of 
plurivocity.  Bosman  takes  up  this  idea  describing  it  as  a  debate,  that  he  labels  the 
“Gewordenes-Seiendes” debate. The “Gewordenes” position holds that a linguistic form of 
expression spontaneously arises when that particular stage of human evolution is reached 
where the phenomenon can come into existence. The “Seiendes” point of view supposes that 
the referent is a constant reality but that the linguistic development may be traced until a 
single concept or symbol represents the phenomenon or referent in its totality.   What is 76
notable about this debate is that both positions hold that the role of the language in either 
case is to make available a phenomenon to expression. The idea that the plurivocal nature of 
a term indicates some kind of underlying “truth” of a meant object is  Heidegger’s own, 
which justifies our attention to the detail here. But little of the analysis to this point has 
justified a  temporal  reading of  conscience,  that  we nominated as  the  goal  at  the  outset. 
However, if we look closely at the language Heidegger utilises to describe conscience, we 
see a great deal of correlation with his own examination of Paul, clearly a vital player in the 
development of Heidegger’s thinking. The next chapter will move into an interpretation of 
Heidegger’s  work,  The  Phenomenology  of  Religion,  where  a  path  to  the  unification  of 
conscience and Dasein’s primordial temporality is brought to light. 
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Chapter 4 - Heidegger and Paul the 
Apostle
The  previous  chapter  makes  clear  that  in  utilising  the  language  of  conscience, 
Heidegger  is  involving  his  analysis  in  a  complex  history.  The  “vulgar”  conceptions  are 
identified by Heidegger as “levelling down” the phenomenon of conscience into something 
“ontologically suspect”. However, the technique by which he arrives at his own formulation 
of it in Being and Time is not made explicit there, and the question of our own access to the 
phenomenon  proper  remains  unanswered.  Thus,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  better 
understand the nature of Heidegger’s ontological process. We seek a way to understand how 
theological  or  philosophical  ideas  similar  to  conscience  might  be  uncovered  in  their 
authentic sense. The path to this revelation, that is a deconstruction of theological principles, 
will  come  by  way  of  an  analysis  of  Heidegger’s  own  deconstruction  outlined  in  The 
Phenomenology of  Religion.  This  text  outlines the technique that  Heidegger has used to 
isolate within the theological that which he sees as levelled down in theory, and thus to form 
an understanding of the place of Heidegger’s conscience within his thinking as a whole. It is 
also here that the possibility of a temporal reading of conscience comes to light.
§ 11 - HEIDEGGER’S THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION
The “vulgar” interpretations of conscience reveal the strong connections of the term 
with theology, but what Heidegger’s conception shares with these remain at large. Heidegger 
does not claim in Being and Time  that he is drawing inspiration from theology, but does 
point  to  his  own  method  as  a  Destruktion,  an  attempt  to  arrive  at  those  primordial 
experiences that determine our understanding of Being. Ben Vedder argues that it is clear 
from the evolution of Heidegger’s thought that he is undertaking to radically reformulate 
those ideas into which he was born. Heidegger’s father, a sexton, raised the family in a house 
next to a church and fostered within his family a strong sense of God and Heidegger himself 
(in a letter written to Karl Jaspers) indicates it was his intention to “explicate the religious 
tradition  in  which  he  had  been  raised.”  But  Heidegger  was  not  content  with  only  a 77
description of his world, and Vedder states that to Heidegger, “the task of the thinker is to 
clarify and explicate the place of the holy. The question of god in relation to the question of 
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being, and the question of the holy in its relation to the question of being, need to be strictly 
separated.”  78
In a sense,  Heidegger’s approach became a stripping away of the religious from 
theology, an attempt to bring about an atheistic theology of sorts. Heidegger puts it bluntly 
that “he does not know god; he can only describe god’s absence.”  This is not a way of 79
rejecting a sense of God or spirituality, but as he explains in Identity and Difference that “the 
god-less  thinking which must  abandon the god of  philosophy,  god as  causa sui,  is  thus 
perhaps closer to the divine God.”  Finding the “real truth” in theology does not mean to 80
turn religion into science, as to do so is to prevent religion from emerging to the philosopher 
“from religion itself qua religion.”  Heidegger explains that blind subscription to any set of 81
ideas is unphilosophical, and approaching philosophy with any preset ideas not born out of 
experience  itself  is  essentially  dogmatic.  Heidegger’s  task  is  thus  also  to  “liberate” 
philosophy from its “secularization” to a science.  To elevate science to the ultimate method 82
of investigation, and to treat its principles as eternal and therefore necessarily and universally 
valid, is to ignore the fact that even science is dependent on the “particular, factical-historical 
situation of science.”  83
The goal of any philosophical enquiry to Heidegger, and indeed in general, might be 
said to be to describe experience “truly”. However, any claims of truth or originality,  to 
Heidegger, depend on their historical “location” and the hermeneutic situation. We cannot 
discard the effects of this situation simply by being aware of it. A “detached” study even of 
the history of philosophy or things in general,  is  already a treatment of objects in time, 
implying from the outset a temporality, a becoming, as a result of their “historical context”. 
Rather, any such study reveals anew the fact that the human being, in their reaching for 
“authentic”  life,  is  engaged  already  in  a  struggle  for  originality,  one  that  “incessantly 
accompanies, like a shadow, each attempt at a new creation.”  This specific struggle cannot 84
be overcome, but instead must be clearly understood, by grounding an understanding of the 
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“historical problem” from the position of factical life, rather than the other way around.  85
The human being, instead of in history, is defined as a kind of “object in becoming, standing 
within time” and thus itself has the characteristic of being historical.  Heidegger describes 86
this reconception as a “Copernican act”, as a revolutionary and “destructive” event. 
To  Heidegger,  this  being  historical  comes  to  mean  the  “becoming,  emergence, 
proceeding  in  time,  a  characterization  that  befits  a  reality.”  This  ambiguous  definition 87
requires a clarification that will go on to dominate the majority of Heidegger’s early works. 
Heidegger’s  method  is  to  approach  a  study  of  history  from “things”  [Gegenstand],  not 
objects,  but  rather  from that  which  is  experienced  directly  in  factical  life:  “Red,  color, 
sensual quality, experience, genus, species, essence, are things.”  These “things” are not the 88
theoretical conceptions these words signify, not something “objectively”, nor “subjectively” 
defined,  but  instead moments of  understanding that  arise from out  of  the living present. 
Heidegger  calls  for  a  return  to  the  phenomena  themselves.  Thus,  the  proper  actionof 
philosophy is not to place a phenomenon in a formal category as a thing, but instead to 
accept that there are different ways that we can characterise that which comes into being at 
all.  Heidegger  states  that  such a  stance “is  opposed to  science in  the  highest  degree.”  89
Where science attempts to establish an exact methodology, where correctness is in some 
sense “guaranteed” at the outset, phenomenology attempts to understand that which occurs 
from out of the enactment of world as such. 
What Heidegger is seeking to establish is a turn from the object-historical complex 
to the enactment-historical situation, derived from the phenomena of factical life experience. 
Even time itself can be said to depend first on its expression in experience rather than as 
something inflicted upon experience secondarily. Heidegger explains, “the time of factical 
life is to be gained from the complex of enactment of factical life itself, and from there the 
static or dynamic character of the situation is to be determined.”  Thus, even the present 90
itself must be seen as historical, which is nothing else but an “ebb and flow of the becoming 
of being which rests in its midst.”  Thus, when Heidegger returns to the problem at hand, 91
that is a way to understand theology “truly”, he does not seek to eradicate or ignore the 
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knowledge that is the “modern history of religion”. Rather, he moves to approach its content 
as explications of the lives of the Christian individuals, who to Heidegger live “temporality 
as such”. In order to understand the “knowledge” of theology he looks to the movement and 
temporality  expressed  in  the  explication  of  the  individual’s  own  factical  experience. 
However, even in this he must hold in mind the ever present influence of his own experience 
that determines what is seen. Only in this way is it possible to reach a determination of a 
thing,  a  phenomenon,  in  the  way  that  it  “is”.  This  is  Heidegger’s  phenomenology,  his 
“Destruktion” and the source of his ontological process.
§ 12 - THE PAULIAN EXPERIENCE
The next step in our analysis is to attempt to understand the way that Heidegger 
himself  has  deconstructed  Paul’s  explication.  This  process  will  be  essentially 
phenomenological, and represents Heidegger’s attempt to unveil Paul’s experience of world 
and his situation. Heidegger outlines his ambition directly:
“Why exactly the Christian religiosity lies in the focus of our study, that is a difficult 
question; it is answerable only through the solution of the problem of the historical 
connections. The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to 
be explicated from out of our own historical situation and facticity. At issue is what 
the sense of history can signify for us, so that the “objectivity” of the historical “in 
itself”  disappears.  History  exists  only  from out  of  a  present.  Only  thus  can  the 
possibility of a philosophy of religion be begun.”92
Paul represents to Heidegger the exemplar or “originary” Christian, and thus is a key 
point of reference for understanding of the idea of conscience. The term “Christian” applies 
in this setting to a very particular, and rather unusual kind of relationship. Paul, like most 
Christians, was writing in a time years distant from the “death” of Christ. Thus, when Paul 
speaks of  Christ  he is  describing an “historical” relationship,  that  is  one that  involves a 
position toward something that has already occurred. The “reality” or “world” (Heidegger’s 
translations for the term αιον) for Paul is of a nature different to that of the non-believer. In 
this reality: “The present time has already reached its end and a new [αιον] has begun since 
the death of Christ.”  This is not to relegate the present to the past, but to say that this 93
“ending” is a component and vitally interwoven part of any present of which we may speak. 
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This brings us to the concept of the παρουσία,  which Heidegger defines as “the 
appearing again of the already appeared Messiah,” which we again must be careful not to 
interpret literally, as Heidegger himself warns.  The παρουσία is the “second coming” of 94
the Messiah, which represents essentially the end of the world. It is a concept closely related 
to the ἔσχατον [the “last”] and the καιρός [the right time] - which are important concepts to 
keep  in  mind  for  later.  The  παρουσία  is  something  not  yet  present,  and  the  Christian 
position  toward  it  is  a  sense  of  “awaiting”,  but  as  Heidegger  states:  “The  structure  of 
Christian hope, which in truth is the relational sense of παρουσία is radically different from 
all expectation.”  Paul addresses the παρουσία not in terms any kind of “objective” time 95
nor the “when” of something to come, but rather as something imminent, something already 
upon the Christian in a particular way. Heidegger points out: “The entire question for Paul is 
not a cognitive question…He does not say, “at this or that time the Lord will come again”; he 
also does not say, “I do not know when he will come again”—rather he says: “You know 
exactly…”  To Heidegger’s Paul, the knowledge of the παρουσία is one that the Christian 96
knows with themselves, a deeply personal and unsharable certainty of the already coming of 
the end.  
This deeply personal faith and relationship to the παρουσία we will cautiously label 
as  “authentic  faith”.  In  authentic  faith,  the  question  of  the  “when”  of  the  παρουσία  is 
brought back to a dependence on the life of the Christian themselves. The problem for the 
life of the Christian then is one of enactment, and more specifically of comportment: how to 
live in the knowledge of that which is already at an end. The imminence of the ending robs 
the Christian of any security, and this is of primary importance to the conduct required of 
them. Heidegger describes Paul’s answer to the question of the “when” of the παρουσία as 
“an urging to awaken and to be sober.” It is not the case that one should be passive and 
mourn something lost,  nor that  once should burden oneself  overly with worry about the 
concrete detail of day-to-day dealings. The question for the Christian is more personal, and 
has to do with “the enactment of factical life experience in each of its moments.”97
§ 13 - CONSCIENCE AND THE ΠΑΡΟΥΣΊΑ
This essay proposes that for Paul and Heidegger both, the conscience lies upon a 
kind of boundary between the “when” of the παρουσία and the “how” of self-comportment. 
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The nature of this boundary will be clarified with greater detail in Chapter 8 of this essay. In 
Being  and  Time,  conscience  lies  on  the  boundary  between  authentic  and  inauthentic 
existence and temporality. For Heidegger’s Paul it is a comportment, impregnated with the 
constant presence of a guiding conscience, that retains the individual in a position toward the 
παρουσία  and  the  specific  temporality  it  demands.  To both,  conscience  has  to  do  with 
enactment appropriate to the “situation”, it is a coming to be aware of the situation in such a 
way that comportment becomes an immediate issue. Both see the conscience as radically 
individual, that is personal and historical.  At once we see how, instead of semantically, these 
ideas are linked much more fundamentally, the closeness of which is driven by the temporal 
sense that they share. However, as aforementioned, the language chosen by Heidegger in his 
description of conscience in Being and Time was done so deliberately and within it the ties to 
his interpretation of the history of the phenomenon will be found.
Although deeply individual, the experience of the Christian is not isolated, but its 
specific temporality is “co-experienced”, such that a relationship to the παρουσία can be 
shared. This does not mean that early Christians shared their specific relationship with Christ 
and life, rather that their enactment of life is common in a fundamental way.  The sharing of 98
this  altered  enactment  is  mediated,  at  least  initially,  by  proclamation.  Proclamation  is  a 
sharing  of  the  need to  alter  enactment  in  view of  a  relationship  with  the  παρουσία  as 
imminent.  This  knowledge  with  others,  to  do  with  enactment,  rings  heavily  of  our 
conception of Paulian conscience afore established. This tie runs further in the language used 
by  Heidegger,  wherein  he  highlights  “the  connection  of  calling,  proclamation,  doctrine, 
warning.”  The calling of the Christian in their proclamation is of a very specific character, 99
which on closer examination is tied closely to the temporal. 
If we consider the nature of a call in general, we immediately see that it carries itself 
a unique temporality. A call is a communication that comes from “afar”.  It has the character 
the opposite of a secret. Its content is not to be hidden and acted upon slowly and carefully at 
a time not yet, but revealed in the immediate as something that cannot wait. What defines it 
is a sense of “urgency”, an abruptness that brings one to attention. Clearly, one does not call 
to keep things as they are, but to spur a vital change: one does not proclaim nor call the 
mundane. Paul in his proclamation is calling others to his particular character of the moment, 
to a realisation of the nature of the situation in its urgency and secondarily calling for a 
change in enactment.  Paul  also uses the term ὑπερεκπερισσοῦ  to describe the situation 
made  evident  by  the  proclamation,  which  is  commonly  translated  to  “most  earnest”.  It 
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carries with it a sense of great abundance and even violence. Heidegger himself translates 
the  term  as  “a  very  strong  expression  for  “urgent”.”  Thus,  we  are  led  to  a  specific 100
temporality of Paul’s call. Those who hear the call are “in more imminent expectation of the 
παρουσία” and “no longer work and loiter idly.”  They are called out of the temporality of 101
the masses, those who are bound up with “all the bustling activity of talk and idling”, those 
who “occupy themselves with the question, whether the Lord will come immediately” and 
into a sharper awareness of the urgency of the situation.102
Another important association with the παρουσία  and the call, is that they carry 
with them a unique, but necessary θλῖψις - translated by Heidegger as Bedrängnis [distress]. 
Heidegger writes: “The experience is an absolute distress which belongs to the life of the 
Christian himself. The acceptance is an entering-oneself-into anguish.”  In answering the 103
call, the Christian is faced with the anguish of the already-coming-to-an-end. The anguish is 
in fact a sign of the acceptance of God, the ἔνδειγμα, proof of the calling that is distinctive 
of the Christian and distinguishing those who are called from those he has rejected. Although 
the  language used is  not  identical,  the  relationship  between this  θλῖψις  and the  anxiety 
[Angst]  of  Being  and  Time  is  not  easily  overlooked,  especially  given  the  nature  of  its 
relationship to the calling. A more detailed discussion of the idea of anxiety will be found in 
the next chapter. Regardless, the movement of Heidegger’s destruction is becoming more 
clear,  and  it  becomes  evident  that  what  comes  to  be  authenticity  in  Being  and  Time  is 
extremely  closely  related  to  what  we  labelled  as  “authentic  faith”  as  described  in  The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life. Heidegger’s task in this is a massive one, one he himself 
compared with the revolution of Copernicus, and its gradual evolution took him decades to 
clarify, only to leave the task incomplete in Being and Time. This is not to say that the lines 
between these works are straight, and that the correlations we have drawn here are direct, but 
simply  that  Heidegger’s  process  began  in  the  theological  and  opened  itself  into  the 
ontological. What we must be aware of is the persistence of a conception of temporality in 
Heidegger’s works, as that which underpins any understanding of the human condition.
Heidegger’s position so far can be summarised by his own summation found in §30, 
where he writes:
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"The factical life experience of the Christians is historically determined insofar as it 
always begins with the proclamation…The significances of life remain, but a new 
comportment arises. We want to follow further the problem of proclamation in such 
a way that we leave matters of content entirely aside; now it must be shown that 
Christian  religiosity  lives  temporality…Christian  factical  life  experience  is 
historically determined by its emergence with the proclamation that hits the people 
in a moment, and then is unceasingly also alive in the enactment of life.”104
In moving into the realm of true faith, which we have tied to authenticity, the individual 
takes  on  a  different  sense  of  time,  that  represents  a  modification,  not  a  moving out  of, 
common time.  To Heidegger and Paul,  the Christian does not  step out  of  this  world by 
answering the call, but is instead radically reorganised in the way that they remain.  Let us 105
here take note that Heidegger translates the phrase from 1 Thes 5:1: “περι των χρόνων και 
των  καιρων” as “time and moment” [Zeit  und Augenblick].  The Christian,  in their  new 
position toward the end, finds their  present changed into a new kind of temporality that 
Heidegger  defines  as  the  “moment”  [Augenblick].  This  moment  is  characterised  by  a 
particularity, a decisiveness, that is unique to the ancient concept of the καιρός. The moment 
for the Christian comes suddenly, and not without its struggle. Heidegger later calls to the 
Christian to “Put on the armor!” in preparation for impending strife [Kampf]. The call, the 
coming of the moment, “for those who have no hope and thus despair, but have seeming 
happiness and security, it comes as “sudden” and inescapable; unexpected, unprepared for it; 
no means for overcoming and taking a stance; they are handed over to it.”  The καιρός 106
(“the appointed time”) comes suddenly and remains compressed, but its anticipation spurs on 
the individual to alter their comportment: their enactment of life. No longer do they remain 
hidden in darkness, but are brought to themselves: “They do not “look” at it, and run away 
from themselves.”  107
We have thus established a little of the nature of the temporality of the Christian, as 
compressed, sudden and urgent, as they come to themselves. The future is made present, and 
the  ending  (παρουσία)  moves  to  stand  as  something  imminent,  constantly  present  as 
possibility. The past, as the previous coming, equally comes into the moment as the already 
here and as that which is to be repeated. Much more than this we need not explore here, for 
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these features of  “the moment” will  be explored in the following chapters.  All  we need 
identify  at  this  point  is  that  the  Christian,  like  authentic  Dasein,  in  hearing a  call  finds 
themself in a special moment that radically redefines their enactment. This moment relates in 
a  particular  way  to  the  καιρός  (the  appointed  time),  but  this  relation  is  not  yet  clear. 
Importantly, this relation is not made explicit in The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Still, 
at this point, Heidegger is of the opinion that “the Christian is conscious that this facticity 
cannot be won out of his own strength, but rather originates from God—the phenomenon of 
the effects of grace.”  What he will ultimately seek is to find a path through which Dasein’s 108
authenticity can be achieved out of its own being, as whole in itself.
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Chapter 5 - The Temporality of Dasein
§ 14 - THE MOVEMENT OF DASEIN AS OCCURRENCE
 In  the  previous  chapter  we  laid  out  a  specific  formulation  of  temporality  that 
Heidegger uncovered in his analysis of the works of Paul.  Paul’s factical  relation to the 
παρουσία carries with it a sense of both future, past and present. That which has occurred 
already, determines the future and its inevitable repetition of that past, and this is occurring 
in a kind of meeting point of these horizons: the present. The καιρός is that appointed time, 
the coming that has already come. It is imminently present as the possibility that is always 
outstanding for the Christian. Such a temporality is extremely complex and enigmatic, and 
represents part of that problem that Heidegger seeks to answer in Being and Time. Such a 
temporality  closely  reflects  the  specific  temporality  that  we find described  as  “authentic 
time” in the Second Division of Heidegger’s famous text. We will come to see the various 
reasons that  such a comparison is  justified,  but  ultimately,  the question that  needs to be 
answered is how this temporality might apply beyond the Christian existence. Does any such 
possibility  for  authenticity  exist  for  humankind universally,  or  is  this  concept  to  remain 
exclusively bound to the religious? 
In many ways, Heidegger’s approach to the question of temporality is bound up with 
his approach to philosophy itself.  Ultimately, as outlined above, Heidegger sees that any 
explication  of  the  human  condition  will  be  necessarily  bound  to  the  situation  of  the 
explicator. To Heidegger, recognising this situation does not create an inexplicable “loop” of 
reason, but of itself represents a positive phenomenon requiring of explanation. The problem 
that  Heidegger is  trying to solve is  that  of  hermeneutics.  Any attempt to understand the 
nature of being is grounded necessarily in the perspective of the interpreter,  who carries 
necessarily a set of preconceptions rooted in their historical setting. This very fact represents 
Heidegger’s starting point in Being and Time, that is the sense of “always-already”. Dasein is 
always already in a world, populated with beings both like and unlike itself. It is always 
already in a mood, in a place and “in” time. It is thrust, rather born, into a world that contains 
ideas, values and influences. The “always-already” becomes a horizon for understanding the 
very  movement  of  Dasein,  as  something  that  has  a  kind  of  “past”,  more  appropriately 
labelled as a “history”. Dasein is thrown into existence and is concerned with that which it 
finds necessarily. This concern, or “care”, is that which causes Dasein to take its history and 
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its world into question. Dasein is essentially and primordially this concern. As care, Dasein 
is not involved with its history in a detached sense but engages with it actively. 
What  this  means  is  that  Dasein  is  not  a  static  or  objective  presence,  but 
fundamentally a kind of movement. In a sense, Dasein is always moving even when it is still; 
it does not rest as it is, but is rather perpetually concerned with how it will be. This constant 
“preparation” is determined by that which it  has been, but in its  process it  is  constantly 
reworking and “understanding” its past. The past is perpetually in movement with the future 
to create the movement of Dasein as temporal. Care, that is concern with existence, is to be 
understood as something temporal. Heidegger, thus describes Dasein not as an object or a 
subject, a body or a soul, not as a mind or a psyche or even as an idea or concept, but instead 
as an “occurrence”. He writes: “The movement of existence is not the motion of something 
objectively  present.  It  is  determined  from  the  stretching  along  of  Dasein.  The  specific 
movement of the stretched out stretching itself along, we call the occurrence [Geschehen] of 
Dasein.”  Geschehen  is  a  German  word  that  finds  its  roots  in  the  proto-Germanic 109
“*skehaną” which literally translates to “spring up”, which gradually developed to mean 
something close to emergence or happening. Dasein is not something that “is” in the sense of 
a being encountered in the world, but a type of movement that happens: it is an event. As an 
event, it is ultimately a historical concern, not as an object for historiographical study, but as 
something essentially temporal and thus constituted by historicity.
§ 15 - DASEIN, DEATH AND AUTHENTIC TIME
We established previously that to Heidegger, Dasein is always already thrust into a 
world, and that world is comprised of other beings. Beings like Dasein have a distinctive 
effect on Dasein that cause it to lose sight of itself. Dasein, as care, concerns itself with 
others and that which they are concerned with, and in so doing it disperses itself amongst 
them. It loses touch with that which is true for itself, and busies itself in a world of ideas and 
opinions that are “levelled down” to the point that they become “untruths”. Dasein becomes 
fragmented,  concealed  to  itself,  and  ultimately  lost  in  a  history  that  “has  become 
unrecognisable to it.”  Dasein, in its absorption into the “they”, loses even a sense of time, 110
and instead finds itself adrift in a shared time that is ultimately divided. This common time 
can be broken down into days, hours or even seconds, but no matter how small the divisions 
are made it cannot ever encompass a “moment” that Dasein can take hold of as its own. If 
Dasein is to take hold of itself, and make itself free to decide on its project, it must “pull 
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itself together”. The temporality of Dasein afore described leaves us to consider Dasein as 
something always outstanding, incomplete, to do with its constantly becoming other than it 
is. We will remember that it is in this way that Dasein can possibly be guilty, as in its very 
essence it is always lacking. It lacks essentially, and carries this sense with it always. What 
possibility is there then for Dasein to reveal itself as complete?
Completeness  can  possibly  come  to  Dasein  by  means  of  a  modification  of  its 
movement  in  time.  We  have  established  that  Dasein  involves  a  special  kind  of  futural 
movement, one that means it is always what it is becoming. The question for Heidegger is 
whether this (perhaps) infinite succession comes to an end, and this brings him logically to 
death. Heidegger writes: “In Dasein there is inevitably a constant “lack of wholeness” which 
finds its end in death.”  Death brings with it two vital elements to the movement of Dasein 111
that create the possibility of completeness. The first is the idea of an end, being the cessation 
of progression. The cessation of what is outstanding in Dasein is in fact the cessation of the 
being of Dasein itself.  However,  the nature of Dasein means that what is outstanding in 
Dasein already belongs to it, and is never something to be added on. Heidegger on this point 
makes reference to Paul, who already in his time had seen the way that death was in fact 
together  with  life.  Dasein  is  not  finished  or  necessarily  fulfilled  by  the  addition  of 112
something that is death, it is not somehow completely available as a result of dying. Instead, 
Dasein, as something which is always already outstanding in a way, already has its end as 
part of it: it is its end. “Because death is already integrated into the dynamic movement of 
existence,  the  act  of  anticipating  it  concretizes  care  as  an  unbroken  totality,  without 
remainder.”  Thus, the coming-to-its-end and the no-longer-Dasein forms part of the not-113
yet-at-an-end, that is the temporality of Dasein, and ultimately dying is grounded in care.  114
The second is that death is absolutely non-relational. Dasein is initially introduced to 
death through a witnessing of the deaths of other beings like Dasein. This reminds Dasein of 
its inevitable end and provides the realisation of the possibility of the transition between the 
being  of  Dasein  to  no-longer-Dasein.  But  such  an  experience  is  not  parallel  with  an 
experience  of  the  death  of  Dasein  itself,  for  “the  real  having  coming  to  an  end  of  the 
deceased is precisely not experienced.”  Death, for Dasein, is its very own possibility of no 115
longer being able to be there. In accepting death as something imminent for it alone, Dasein 
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is completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality of being. The possibility of its own 
impossibility shakes Dasein to its very core, and denies it of the possibilities available to it in 
the world of everydayness and all relations to others are dissolved. 
The task for authentic Dasein is not to “become certain” about its own death, as this 
is not the “truth” of death either. The empirical certainty of death is a treatment of death as a 
mere theoretical consideration. In this way, one can be assured that death will come, but not 
that it simply always may come. It is the indefiniteness of death that brings Dasein before 
itself  authentically.  An  authentic  understanding  of  death  is  as  Dasein’s  ownmost,  non-
relational, insuperable possibility that is as such indefinite. Death as a possibility cannot be 
something  that  is  taken  care  of  in  the  world,  with  a  view towards  its  actualisation.  To 
Heidegger,  we  must  be  towards  death  in  a  way  that  he  terms  anticipation,  rather  than 
expectation. As such, the death of Dasein is not being at an end but rather being toward its 
end. Dasein is thrown into death from the moment of birth, and as such it belongs essentially 
to the thrownness of Dasein that reveals itself in attunement. This particular but non-specific 
attunement is anxiety. 
In  the  anticipation  of  death,  Dasein  must  bring  itself  into  acceptance  of  the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. Such a state of being is fundamentally 
anxiety provoking for Dasein. Anxiety is not simply a mood of Dasein, rather its primordial 
attunement, that has to do with the very fact of being-in-the-world itself. Anxiety is not a fear 
of one's  demise,  it  does not come into being secondary to some situation,  but instead it 
represents the primordial fact that Dasein is a being that exists as thrown-being-towards-its-
end. Accepting death as a perpetual possibility, Dasein must remain in anxiety, and not turn 
from it into the tranquillising certainty of its definite coming, that is characteristic of the 
public attitude toward death. To Heidegger, the fact that Dasein’s attitude or stance towards 
death can be levelled down in being-with others is not evidence that this being-toward does 
not belong to it universally, but instead reveals something more primordial about Dasein’s 
relation to death. In being-with others “one subscribes to the silent decree that it is proper to 
have an indifferent calm toward death. Such a position estranges Dasein from its ownmost 
nonrelational potentiality of being.”  Dasein in fact attempts to turn away from its concern 116
with its ownmost end, tranquillising itself into a mode of untroubled indifference, in order to 
assuage the anxiety. But such an existence does not silence anxiety, instead it places Dasein 
into perpetual discontent, torn between the unease of being followed around its world by a 
nagging uncanniness, or thrust out of its tranquillised calm by waves of anxiety. Anxiety is 
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that  which  brings  the  being  of  Dasein  before  itself  as  itself,  no  longer  awash  in  the 
uncanniness of world with others, but radically aware of itself as a being already dying.
Heidegger elucidates the irony of the public attitude toward death made apparent by 
his analysis of anxiety. In the public realm dwelling or even thinking about death represents 
a  “cowardly  fear”  and  a  “gloomy flight  from the  world.”  Paradoxically,  the  superior, 117
untroubled indifference to death of the “they” is reoriented by Heidegger to represent the 
paragon of cowardice. The one who turns from death in this way “does not dare” turn to face 
it  and  the  anxiety  it  brings.  In  order  to  exist  authentically,  one  must  show  “courage”, 
“conviction”, “must not be weakened” and “endure” the vulnerability and discomfort of its 
coming. One must remain in “anticipation” of the possibility of death, and not turn from it as 
a mere “fact” of existence. In this we are brought again to conscience. The anticipation of 
death is of vital import if we are to understand the specific temporality of conscience as 
something expected and prepared for. The movement of death and conscience is ultimately 
one, and that is the movement of care as temporality. Heidegger defines temporality as the 
primordial  condition  of  the  possibility  of  care,  and  that  an  “equiprimordial  connection” 
between death, guilt and conscience is rooted in this.118
Ultimately, the question of authenticity comes to be attached to the issue of freedom. 
As always already bound up with its world, does Dasein ever have the capacity to regain 
control over its possibilities? The answer to Heidegger is a historical concern, and in many 
ways involves a redefinition of freedom as it  was previously defined. As guilty,  we will 
recall, Dasein exists as that which it is not yet, the interpretation of which is grounded in that 
which it is already. Thus, to some extent, Dasein is “never to gain power over one’s ownmost 
being from the ground up.”  Instead, the way in which Dasein might be free is to throw 119
itself into itself, that is ground its self in itself in the situation in which and that it is. By 
becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation one is capable of being liberated from the 
“lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us.”  However, death is only one 120
end of the story for Dasein and the complete picture of freedom is only made possible if the 
other  end,  birth,  is  taken  into  consideration.  Dasein  is  not  only  its  possible  end,  but 
ultimately the being between birth and death. The “self” of  Dasein is nothing like the “sum 
of momentary realities of experiences”, nor is it a framework that is gradually filled up, as it 
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is defined by the communal world.  The self of Dasein, Heidegger states, is a “stretching 121
out” of Dasein between its ends, and this stretching represents the “connection of life” that 
represents the complete self of Dasein.
Birth and death are part of Dasein from the outset, and any kind of freedom it can 
potentially be attributed must take this into account. Dasein is born into a history that is 
“handed down” and is  always still  having an effect.  The common view of  history is  as 
something in the past, but Heidegger raises the pertinent question of why “the having been 
predominantly determines what is historical when, after all, having-been temporalises itself 
equiprimordially with present and future.” Such a formulation of history should remind us 
here of the specific temporality of the “authentic Christian", which we previously correlated 
with authentic time. In authentic time, Dasein approaches its history, or as Heidegger names 
its  heritage  [Erbe]  as  something  present.  Heidegger  writes:  “Resolute  coming  back  to 
thrownness  involves  handing  oneself  over  to  traditional  possibilities,  although  not 
necessarily as traditional ones.”  Thus, freedom (authenticity) consists not in the creation 122
of radically new ways of being, but from choosing which of those to repeat from that which 
is available to Dasein in its situation. Heidegger explains:
“When one has death before one as certain and lays hold of it as such, one’s life 
becomes visible in itself. When death is in this manner, it gives to life a certain way 
of seeing itself and constantly leads it before its ownmost present and past, a past 
that, burgeoning within life itself, comes toward it from behind it.”  123
Thus, in repetition, Dasein takes hold of its situation and can “be in the Moment for 
its time.”  This idea of the “moment” [Augenblick] will be revisited later on, but for now it 124
is important that we understand the nature of authentic time as a position toward birth and 
death, that realises the situation of Dasein as thrown-being-towards-its-end, and is thus able 
to choose authentically its own possibilities. 
Finally,  we are  drawn back to  the  original  question at  hand.  Now the nature  of 
authentic temporality has been defined as distinct from the inauthentic, and the analysis of 
death has revealed the necessity for a position of anticipation in order for this to be accessed, 
we must return to the role of conscience. As always already entangled, Dasein must find a 
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way to disentangle itself. As whole, Dasein must source this capacity from itself; it must 
come from part of its experience as that which represents the starting point for any analysis 
of  the  phenomenon of  Dasein  at  all.  Coyne makes  explicit  that:  “The analysis  of  death 
suggests that conscience will accomplish this, indirectly revealing the nature of testimony 
and attestation: “Manifestly Dasein itself must, in its Being, present [vorgeben] us with the 
possibility and the manner of its authentic existence, unless such existence is something that 
can be imposed upon it ontically, or ontologically fabricated. The attestation [Bezeugung] of 
an authentic potentiality-for-Being is given by conscience.”125
 Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions, p136 translation from SZ p234125
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Chapter 6 - The Temporality of 
Conscience
§ 16 - CONSCIENCE AS PREPARATION
“We  cannot  decide  to  bring  the  voice  of  conscience  to  bear  on  inauthenticity, 
although we can want [Wollen] to have a conscience in the sense that we can stand 
ready for it and resolutely prepared for it.  Authentic speaking has to be made room 
for and allowed to be made manifest.  It is not a matter, either, of going looking for 
it in the form of curiosity.  It comes suddenly for one who is prepared.  It speaks to 
us.” 
- Brogan, Listening to the Silence, p36 
Authenticity is not something that Dasein may simply choose. Instead, as Brogan 
explains, authenticity relies on a kind of preparation that Dasein must undertake, that has to 
do with its stance toward itself. The nature of this preparation requires a making transparent 
or  making  still  of  Dasein,  that  it  might  notice  itself,  in  order  to  ground itself  in  itself. 
Heidegger explains that it is an attunement that “brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and 
authentically, before its “that it is, and as the being that it is, has to be as a potentiality of 
being.””  Anxiety is  that  specific attunement in which the world falls  away and leaves 126
Dasein open for disclosure. In anxiety, and its relation to death, Dasein is “brought before 
itself”, and then, “individualised to itself in its uncanniness, is absolutely unmistakable to 
itself.”  In choosing to listen for conscience and wanting to hear it, Dasein is preparing 127
itself, making itself ready, for the anxiety that conscience essentially is. One prepares for 
conscience  “ahead  of  time”.  During  a  period  when  one  is  unable  to  hear  one  “awaits” 
conscience as something not expected but desired. What such ideas, that is “awaiting” and 
“being ready”, bring to our attention is the decidedly temporal nature of conscience. It seems 
at  times  Dasein  is  not  gathered  together,  but  then  “following”  the  call  there  is  some 
happening - a movement or a change in Dasein. The nature of this “following” is what must 
be made explicit.
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p179126
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From  the  outset  we  must  establish  that  conscience  is  clearly  described  as  a 
“phenomenon of Dasein”. It is not an entity or objectively present being, nor is it an event 
that occurs amidst others encountered by Dasein as a being-in-the-world with other beings. 
As Heidegger explains: “It “is” only in the kind of being of Dasein and makes itself known 
as a fact only in factical existence.”  This immediately distinguishes Heidegger’s idea of 128
conscience from the “vulgar” sense of the word as a moment of speaking or vocalisation. A 
statement is notable within in the passage of the flow of events and, as something shared, it 
can be brought into statement and thus into a communal, inauthentic, sense of time. In Being 
and Time, Heidegger describes conscience as something that is not “occasionally present”. 
This is not to say that it is always present, but crucially it must not be viewed as a voice that 
“turns up” in its place in a series of present experiences and then is absent.  The caller of 129
conscience is  nothing else than Dasein itself,  as such it  is  in no way communal and its 
temporality  is  of  an  explicitly  different  nature.  As  Heidegger  explains:  “The  order  of 
succession in which experiences run their course does not yield the phenomenal structure of 
existing.”  Instead, to Heidegger, the moment of conscience is an event as Dasein is an 130
event, it occurs as Dasein occurs, as a result of its primordial grounding in care. We must 
remember that Heidegger makes it explicit that Dasein is the caller and the called “at the 
same time.”
We will recall that conscience is characterised by Heidegger as a call, and thus as a 
mode of discourse. In his description of the phenomenon, although bound up with discourse 
inextricably, the “call” of conscience is also established as something “silent”; nothing like a 
coming into words. The call is not to do with expression, but with listening. It is a harkening, 
as  opposed  to  a  readiness  to  speak;  authentic  existence  relies  on  a  readiness  to  hear,  a 
reticence in the face of something impending. Hearkening is a making clear, a making still of 
being, such that what needs to be understood can remain or become clear. Heidegger uses the 
term Bereit  [preparation] to describe this  “readiness for  being able to be summoned.”  131
Brogan brings this specific temporality to light, aligning the listening for conscience to a 
specific prepared openness. He writes: 
“Understanding the call is a matter of holding ourselves ready for and open to the 
call.  The call  of  conscience can only be heard in holding ourselves out  towards 
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having a conscience as a possibility for being.  That is…it is a matter of choosing to 
have a conscience, wanting to have a conscience rather than possessing it.”  132
This  making  ready  is  closely  aligned  with  Heidegger’s  own  description  of 
resoluteness, which is a position of Dasein toward impending anxiety and death. Anxiety, in 
the form of uncanniness, follows Dasein always, not as something taken note of as present, 
but  as  something  engaged  with  experience  as  a  whole.  In  resoluteness,  anxiety  is  held 
crucially as a potentiality. As with anxiety, one can turn away from conscience, running into 
the tranquillising temptation of the “they”. The stillness and reticence that prepares Dasein to 
come “face-to-face” with anxiety is that same stance that Dasein must take in order to “hear” 
conscience, to move into authenticity.
Heidegger’s sense of authentic time is described as a movement expressed through 
multiple ecstasies. These ecstasies do not delineate events as moving from one to another, 
but make possible any kind of movement at all. In ecstatic terms, there is a kind of following 
that  is  distinct  from  that  following  of  events  in  the  world.  He  writes:  “The  authentic 
understanding  “following”  the  call  is  not  an  addition  annexed  to  the  phenomenon  of 
conscience,  a  process  that  can  occur  or  else  be  lacking.  The  complete  experience  of 
conscience can only be grasped from understanding the summons together with it.”  What 133
this indicates again is that conscience is part of the overall ecstatic movement of Dasein as 
authentic. It is not the case that conscience occurs, nor is it the case that Dasein is authentic, 
in the way that an object might have an attribute. Rather, conscience opens up (a kind of 
calling forth) Dasein to a different kind of experience that was always available and equally 
a part of Dasein all along. One does not say of conscience that it has been heard nor that it is 
always heard, but there is a sense that it is always available for Dasein. It is always possibly 
involved  in  the  being  of  Dasein.  Thus,  in  a  very  significant  way  we  can  characterise 
conscience  as  something  futural,  to  do  with  the  understanding  nature  of  Dasein,  the 
movement of that which is not-yet. But to relegate conscience to a single ecstasy is to ignore 
its other major attributes. Ultimately, as a phenomenon of Dasein and thus involved in the 
whole movement of Dasein as temporal, all of the three ecstasies of present, past and future 
must move as one in the movement of conscience. Conscience is a component or occurrence 
of the overall occurrence of Dasein that it essentially is.
 Brogan, Listening to the Silence, p39132
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p268133
!  Conscience and Time48
§ 17 - THE JOLT OF CONSCIENCE
The  change  or  modification  of  Dasein  mediated  by  conscience  is  not  gentle. 
Conscience is a call that comes over Dasein and abruptly brings it into a different mode of 
being. He writes explicitly: “In the tendency toward disclosure of the call lies the factor of a 
jolt, of an abrupt arousal.”  The word Stoss, much like its English equivalent “jolt”, came 134
into meaning not as a mental but as a physical phenomenon. As early as the 8th century AD, 
Stoss  was  used  to  describe  a  short,  violent  impact,  jerky  purposeful  movement,  and 
developed to mean something like a strike. In the First World War, the term became used in 
combination with troop, as “Stoßtruppen” [shock troops] who were specifically trained to 
fight with "infiltration tactics", a rapid, sudden method of attack on enemy trenches.  Both 135
“jolt”  and Stoss  over  time came to  gather  associations  until  both were being utilised to 
signify a surprise, a shock that disturbs one's mental composure. Coyne translates it as a 
push.  Brogan emphasises the collapse [zusammensinken] of the they-self that results from 136
having heard the call.  It is clear that conscience to Heidegger is nothing gentle. Thus, the 137
“presentness” of conscience has a specific kind of character. Where it is always present in a 
way for Dasein, as a possibility that must be laid bare, but it seems to “happen” in a way that 
is sudden and disruptive. It lingers and follows, but simultaneously comes over Dasein with 
a powerful and surprising rapidity. 
In Being and Time we find a description of anxiety that unmistakably echoes this 
description of conscience. In anxiety, “what is threatening cannot come closer from a definite 
direction  within  nearness,  it  is  already  “there”  -  and  yet  nowhere.”  This  enigmatic 138
nearness harmonises clearly with the “not-yet” of conscience, as something pursuing Dasein 
in  a  way,  but  not  as  something  ready-to-hand.  Anxiety,  as  uncanniness,  remains  in  the 
shadows so to speak, but “in the dark there is emphatically “nothing” to see, although the 
world  is  still  “there”  more  obtrusively.”  Anxiety,  rather  than  jolting, 139
“collapses” [zusammenbrechen] the familiarity of fallen Dasein. The term Zusammenbruch, 
like Stoss,  implies a sense of force,  a violence and shattering.  It  is  not  a gradual event, 
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something that comes over Dasein slowly or insidiously but literally at times “takes away 
one’s breath.”  140
It is not unreasonable to posit that conscience is attuned, so closely does it move 
with  uncanniness  and  anxiety.  We  have  already  established  the  way  that  conscience  is 
present and anticipated as possibility, but we might also speak of the “always-already” of 
conscience, the following and almost haunting movement of the call.  Unlike attunement, 
however,  the  temporality  of  conscience  is  not  clearly  explained  in  Being  and  Time. 
Attunement is described as that which reveals the already being there of Dasein: it is largely 
to do with the past. Conscience shares the revelatory aspect of attunement, that is it brings to 
light something of the already there of Dasein, but in contrast to attunement is not something 
clearly or specifically related to this single temporal ecstasy. As the essential attunement of 
Dasein, anxiety is a vital and primordial expression of care. Conscience as the “call of care”, 
is an expression of the same movement, and as attuned it has to do with the past. Earlier we 
aligned Heidegger’s idea of past with history, but can we say that conscience is historical?
§ 18 - CONSCIENCE AND THE SITUATION
Heidegger himself identifies that conscience has ties to the historical, but this is not 
simply an engagement with a “past” as defined technically. We will recall that to Heidegger, 
history is a process that we are constantly engaged in. Dasein is historical, not in the sense 
that it is a cumulation of the ends which have transpired before it, but that it is constantly 
engaged in the process of determining how it will be, out of what it has been. Dasein is not 
simply its place in a series of events, but instead a way of being that corresponds to its 
interaction with its history. Its situation equally is not simply an inevitability of a series of 
discrete  events,  measurable  in  time,  but  a  complex  experience  of  Dasein  as  that  which 
reveals any kind of world at all. It indeed is enmeshed in the creation of its world, and as 
such the facts of its history as factical experience. The situation involves Dasein’s active 
interpretation of that which it is thrust into, based upon that which it expects, and in so doing 
makes present that which it can possibly encounter. In a sense Dasein is its situation. When 
we speak of conscience we do not refer to any “substance” that might be present, but really 
of its effects and its role in the movement of Dasein into authenticity. What conscience does 
is draw Dasein into a “noticing” of itself. Engagement “with” conscience, by which we mean 
the resolute reticence of Dasein, does not reveal any thing such as a conscience but instead 
brings Dasein to itself. Thus, in noticing itself, Dasein reveals that which it is: its situation. 
This is nothing like a “now” or “present” as we might define chronologically, but instead a 
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position  toward  that  which  might  be  for  Dasein  in  a  world  of  that  which  already  is: 
“Anticipatory  resoluteness  discloses  the  actual  situation  of  the  there  in  such a  way that 
existence circumspectly takes care of the factical things at hand in the surrounding world in 
action.”141
Thus, the conscience might be described as the process of the situation becoming 
aware of itself. Heidegger writes: “In contrast to circumstances, the situation of factical life 
means the stand taken by life in which it has made itself transparent to itself in its falling and 
has, in worrying about itself in a concrete manner at the particular time, seized upon itself 
and stirred itself in its possibility of a motion running counter to the falling of its care.”  142
We must take note of the inclusion of the phrase “particular time” here in the description of 
the situation. We can relate the seizing and stirring of Dasein to conscience, as that which 
jolts  Dasein  to  an  authentic  movement,  although  the  specific  nature  of  the  jolt  remains 
somewhat at large. It is temporal and has to do with the situation of Dasein, but this notion of 
the “particular time” brings to light something vital about the occurrence of this phenomenon 
as yet not made clear. 
We have afore established that conscience exists in that moment that permits the 
movement into authenticity. The authenticity of Dasein is a certain and specific relationship 
of Dasein to its own history, that we might define as a bringing into light the “facts” of its 
history. Authenticity is at its core a repetition. Thus, conscience is involved in the interaction 
between that which already has been and that which is intended. It lies on boundary of sorts, 
a horizon, an interaction or even conflict, between the past and the future. As Dasein, it is 
bounded between an “already” and a “not-yet.” There is a specific kind of boundary that 
conscience represents, and it is this that we seek to clarify. If we take it for a given that 
conscience is temporal, what we must seek is a way of clarifying the temporality specific to 
this boundary. Our previous analysis of ancient Greek thought, through to the foundations of 
authentic Christian existence, we in many ways have already found our potential answer. As 
with  conscience  itself,  equally  misinterpreted,  ignored  and  “levelled  down”,  traceable 
through  Homer,  the  ancients,  into  Plato  and  Aristotle  and  revitalised  and  brought  to 
significance by Paul, even touched on by Freud, we find - alongside conscience, logos and 
chronological or common time - the idea of the καιρός, and a sense of time we will term as 
“kairological”. It is to here that our analysis must turn.
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Chapter 7 - What is Kairological Time?
§ 19 - THE HISTORY OF THE ΚΑΙΡΌΣ
What  we  seek  in  this  next  chapter  is  to  bring  the  concepts  of  the  καιρός  and 
conscience together, in such a way that we bring greater clarity to Heidegger’s conception of 
conscience. In doing so, a great deal of caution will be required not to distort either concept 
in the attempt to align the two disparate philosophical terms. As such, the process will follow 
a similar course to that which we followed in delineating conscience, that is to first ground 
the concept in its history. As with Heidegger in his delineation of conscience, it is vital that 
the term is not simply interpreted as it has come to be known, but instead we seek to identify 
its  specific  movement  through  its  usage  and  trace  it  to  its  origin.  Thus,  the  journey  is 
necessarily  etymological,  but  equally  if  there  is  to  be consistency in  method it  must  be 
maintained that ultimately the concepts at issue are phenomenological concerns. Thus, the 
ultimate ambition is not semantic, but rather if we are to align these ideas we must look 
closely at how they emerge in factical life. Once their specific movement can be clarified, 
only then can we potentially show some synchronicity between them. 
No discussion of the concept of καιρός can ignore the work of Doro Levi, who in 
his 1923 essay on The Concept of Kairos and the Philosophy of Plato brought the concept 
back into discussion, although it would be largely lost again after this for some time. The 
history of the term καιρός, as with συνείδησις, finds its beginnings in the earliest writings 
of the ancient Greeks, specifically in Homer. In Homer, according to Levi, καιρός originally 
meant “mortal,” and refers to a location on the physical body which, when moved upon 
appropriately, can result in the death of an enemy.  This definition evolved gradually until 143
its use by Theognis, which revealed it had by then gathered a temporal sense, and the idea of 
καιρός as “opportunity” begins to emerge. Again, in the tragedies of Aeschylus it becomes 
more  clearly  a  “time”  rather  than  a  location  to  strike.  By  the  time  of  the  writings  of 
Euripides,  the  temporality  of  the  καιρός  begins  to  carry  a  sense  of  “decisive”  or 
“opportune,” both in the verb and noun forms. Sipiora writes: “From death or “truncation of 
life,” the meaning shifts to decision or “truncation of doubt.””144
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By the Fifth-Century BCE, καιρός has a last come near to its modern interpretation 
as the “right time” or “best opportunity”. It also by then bears with it a sense of action, and 
in that action not only timing but also a sense of “just measure”, and a sense of what is 
necessary. As with conscience, from the point of the writings of Plato and Aristotle, καιρός 
begins  to  be  used  in  a  variety  of  different  settings,  in  each  gathering  a  new  set  of 
associations. It is at this point that our analysis of the history of the term must pause, as 
already it is possible to see how naturally the concept lends itself to discussion of the issues 
related to conscience. This pause is justified also because Heidegger’s own process in Being 
and Time focussed heavily on the Greeks (in particular Aristotle and Plato) and tended to 
guide his analysis of the early Christian concepts, such as conscience, which we have already 
discussed at length.
In Plato, we begin to see how καιρός  can come to be understood in the factical 
experience of the human being, and how it as a temporal concept differs from its counterpart 
χρόνος. Χρόνος was a representation of time in a largely linear or sequential sense. Such a 
sense of time becomes the focus of Artistotle’s analysis of time in his Physics, and represents 
(perhaps until Heidegger) the primary basis for philosophical and scientific understanding of 
time  for  the  next  two  millennia.  Aristotle’s  interpretation  of  time  is  as  a  continuous 
phenomenon, “made continuous by the indivisible, present now-moment, which links the 
past to the future by serving as the termination of the past and the beginning of the future, 
just as a mathematical point dissects a line…and is therefore divisible ad infinitum.”  Time, 145
through the great minds of Plotinus and Augustine, carries with it this sense of measurement, 
a phenomenon bound up with mathematics, motion and ultimately number. This is what has 
come to be known as “chronological time”. Smith describes χρόνος as a time that is like “a 
grid  upon  which  events  can  be  plotted  for  the  purpose  of  historical  writing  and 
interpretation.”  He rightly points out, however, that such a conception of time “…leaves 146
us without the purpose, the significance and the evaluating interest which are the necessary 
ingredients both of historical action and of historical interpretation."147
In  the  Philebus,  Plato  places  a  heightened emphasis  on the  active  nature  of  the 
καιρός, and brings to it even more keenly a sense of proper measure. To Plato, any action or 
movement is necessarily bound up with time and situation and thus right action is as such 
situationally and thus historically determined.  Plato seizes upon the καιρός as the right 148
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time in which something of importance can happen, and this comes to constitute the basis of 
historical decision and action.  Such a connection is easily aligned with Heidegger himself, 149
to whom time is bound up with action absolutely. Murchado writes: “Heidegger understood 
time not from the experience of measurement and of measures – as, for example, Aristotle 
did  –  but  rather  from the  experience of  acting.  This  means  that  the  ‘original  time’,  the 
‘initiating [anfängliche]’ time – time in its own emerging – is traceable in action.”  What 150
we must make clear though is that the καιρός, although involved with action, was no longer 
to do with the physical action itself, but represented a moment, a situation, in which a certain 
type of action was able to take place.
§ 20 - ΚΑΙΡΌΣ AND ΛΌΓΟΣ
 It is in Isocrates that we find another determination of καιρός, not unique to him, 
but one that is taken on into the ideas of Aristotle. Sipiora argues that “Isocrates postulates a 
symbiotic relationship between φρόνησῐς and effective discourse.”  What we must keep in 151
mind here is that discourse, or λόγος, is fluidly taken up into the concept of καιρός, in such 
a way that they become inseparable in later discussions of καιρός. Isocrates writes: “Whom, 
then,  do  I  call  educated?…First,  those  who  manage  well  the  circumstances  which  they 
encounter day by day, and who possess a judgement which is accurate in meeting occasions 
as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action; next, those who are decent and 
honourable  in  their  intercourse  with  all  with  whom they  associate.”  To Isocrates,  the 152
καιρός is not only the right time for action, but action bound up with expression: Πρᾶξις is 
bound up with λόγος. The καιρός was also, in philosophical discourse, to do with the right 
time  to  present  a  certain  argument,  that  it  would  have  the  maximal  and  proper  effect. 
However, in order to speak at the right time, the individual must necessarily enact the right 
processes  of  thought  alongside  and in  symphony with  speech.  “The mystery  of  καιρός 
enables rhetors to choose one λόγος  over another, making one and the same thing seem 
great or small, beautiful or ugly, new or old.”  As such, the καιρός came to be a situation 153
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happened upon by the individual, and expressed and bound up in λόγος, as a primary human 
trait.
It is in Isocrates also that λόγος, πρᾶξις and καιρός come together in symphony to 
be with φρόνησῐς. He writes: “We shall find that none of the things which are done with 
φρόνησῐς takes place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well in all our 
thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.”  154
Further, in Antidosis he states “Those who most apply their minds to discourse situations and 
are able to discern the consequences which for the most part grow out of them, will most 
often meet these occasions in the right way.”  So we are led through this progression of the 155
idea of the καιρός into the works or Aristotle, and it is from here we can being to draw 
parallels with Heidegger’s thinking in general. In his delineation of the modes of knowledge 
according to Aristotle, Heidegger elucidates the two major categories as “epistemonikon” 
and’ “logistikon". Φρόνησῐς falls under the heading of "logistikon", and immediately we 
can  identify  its  relation  to  discourse.  The  λόγοι  are  “teachable  and  learnable”  which 
Heidegger concludes are necessarily bound up in “natural speech” to Aristotle.  What this 156
elucidates is the fact that λόγος, φρόνησῐς and πρᾶξις are not divided simply from one 
another. Our next task will be to show the way in which these ideas are related to temporality 
in Heidegger and Aristotle both.
§ 21 - ΚΑΙΡΌΣ, CONSCIENCE AND ΦΡΌΝΗΣῘΣ
To Heidegger’s Aristotle, those kinds of knowledge that deal with “that which is, 
insofar as it always is, is not in time” fall under the category of “epistemonikon”.  For 157
Aristotle those things that are not “in time” are still temporal, but only in the sense that they 
are eternal. We must remember that to Aristotle, as outlined in his Physics, time has to do 
with measurement and related to movement and decay. As measurement, time is defined by 
its  division and thus a series of changes and number.  He writes:  “Hence,  plainly,  things 
which are always are not, as such, in time, for they are not contained by time, nor is their 
being measured by time.”  Φρόνησῐς,  in  contrast  has to do with those things that  are 158
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changeable, that is, necessarily “in” time. What is clear from Heidegger’s lectures is that 
prudential deliberation is a reflective task, to do with a taking notice of the situation. 
Φρόνησῐς, to Heidegger’s Aristotle, is bound up with Dasein’s history, that is to do 
with what “has already been experienced, noted and learned”, yet somehow equally it is “in 
each case new.”  It is historical, concerned with that which is already, but from out of this 159
springs something that was not yet. That which is new is a kind of πρᾶξις that is expressed 
within the world. Heidegger writes: “All going about dealings has its circumspection, and 
what such circumspection provides for these dealings is a certain guiding foresight into their 
with-which  and  the  kind  of  authenticity  it  is  possible  to  achieve  at  the  particular  time 
regarding  it.”  So,  it  is  not  the  case  that  φρόνησῐς  is  set  into  the  world  simply  as  a 160
necessary and determined event that follows from that which proceeds it, but comes as fresh, 
new and bold into its position in a different kind of time. It is not something that occurs and 
then is past either, as unlike other forms of knowledge or art it cannot be forgotten: “As 
regards φρόνησῐς, there is no possibility of falling into forgetting.”  161
Heidegger,  in  explanation  of  the  ‘unforgettable’ nature  of  φρόνησῐς  brings  us 
immediately  to  conscience.  We have above established that  conscience is  that  necessary 
condition for Dasein to be aware of itself, in such a way, that it is able to bring itself before 
itself, in completeness. Existence in truth and wholeness, can sink into concealment with the 
coming of any new circumstance, allowing for the movement of being brought back. That 
which  brings  the  φρόνηιμος  or  Dasein  back  is  the  call  of  conscience  according  to 
Heidegger. Heidegger makes this process explicit in Plato’s Sophist: “Conscience cannot be 
forgotten. But it is quite possible that what is disclosed by conscience can be distorted and 
allowed to be ineffective through…the passions”.  In addition to this, Heidegger posits that 162
conscience  “always  announces  itself”.  So,  as  with  the  Dasein  of  Being  and  Time,  the 
φρόνηιμος is bound by it moods, that is to say both that in which it already finds itself and 
the pains and pleasures of confronting itself and its situation. Heidegger goes as far as to 
specifically state that “φρόνησῐς is nothing other than the conscience set into motion.” Thus 
conscience has a revelatory effect on the human being and is concerned with the way in 
which they move in the world. Heidegger puts it plainly that the role of conscience is to 
make “action” transparent. But action must here not be relegated to practical action in the 
world, as we must distinguish the action with which φρόνησῐς is concerned from that with 
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τέχνη. Instead, the action of the φρόνηιμος has to do with life as a whole. Φρόνησῐς is 
distinct in that it is not to be simply defined as aptitude in practical action, yet equally it is 
not something theoretical. Coyne aptly describes: 
“The  fact  that  practical  reasoning  is  not  susceptible  to  forgetting…proves  for 
Aristotle that it cannot be considered theoretical knowledge or episteme. For his part, 
Heidegger takes this insusceptibility as signifying the constancy of human being-
there-with-itself. And for him the homology between the unity of action in practical 
reasoning and the unity of finitude in anticipating death is instructive: in both cases 
the most extreme element of the relation in question—the end of action in the case 
of  practical  reasoning;  death  in  the  case  of  Dasein—is  immanentized,  included 
within an intentional impulse that constitutes this impulse as a whole.”  163
Essentially, conscience and φρόνησῐς both have to do with the situation of Dasein 
as temporal, and its temporalising nature as a whole. The reasoning and subsequent action 
specific to the φρόνηιμος is to do with the situation, in the sense that it is born out of the 
specific  circumstances  with  which  they  are  faced.  In  The  Nicomachean  Ethics  Aristotle 
makes this explicit: “And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is exact 
precision  possible  in  dealing  with  particular  cases  of  conduct;  for  these  come under  no 
science or professional tradition, but the agents themselves have to consider what is suited to 
the circumstances on each occasion [καιρόν].”  Action, as directed by the conscience, for 164
Heidegger’s Aristotle, is born from a deliberation of circumstances that are specific to the 
individual at a particular time. Prudent action takes place in accordance with its occasion. 
Essentially, the καιρός is the situation made aware of itself, a kind of announcing of itself 
that directs the individual to act accordingly.
Heidegger  himself  uses  the  term καιρός  in  Phenomenological  Interpretations  of 
Aristotle to signify the specific kind of announcement of the situation that occurs in periods 
of acute apprehension. He describes this absolute apprehension in factical life as something 
like “torment”, which is closely related to the anxiety [Angst] we find in Being and Time. 
These ideas are further related in that Heidegger describes this torment as communicating 
something to Dasein that “does not mediate or even intend any cognition.”  Essentially, the 165
καιρός makes itself known through an acute expression of care that brings Dasein into an 
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awareness of itself. This awareness can be lost again in a “becoming frantic over itself and 
confused”, or it can be held onto by a specific kind of “sitting still” that opens Dasein to its 
specific history and allows it to “have” time in a distinct and personal way. What we find in 
these lectures is a prelude to the idea of conscience outlined in Being and Time. However, 
such a reading of the idea of the καιρός is at odds with the consensus interpretations of the 
καιρός in Being and Time. The following chapter will attempt to address this specific issue.  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Chapter 8 - The Kairos in Being and Time
§ 22 - THE ΚΑΙΡΌΣ AND THE AUGENBLICK
Theodore Kisiel writes: “Even though the idea of καιρός  is never used, the idea overtly 
dominates  the  entire  Second  Division  of  Being  and  Time”  of  which  the  discussion  of 
conscience is part.  The Second Division deals with Heidegger’s analysis of temporality, 166
and his explication of his conceptions of authentic and inauthentic time. The καιρός has 
generally been interpreted through Heidegger’s earlier works to be aligned in this division 
with  concept  of  the  Augenblick  [moment].  The Augenblick  in  this  setting represents  the 
holding of Dasein in authenticity and authentic time, a period in which Dasein remains open 
to itself.  With the inauthentic time being so clearly reminiscent of the chronological,  the 
authentic  “presenting”  of  the  Augenblick  is  outwardly  an  obvious  candidate  for  the 
“kairological” variant. However, as Maggini concludes in his exploration of this link, “the 
affinity of the two themes is complex and…no direct line is to be drawn between Heidegger's 
early  development  of  factical  kairology  and  ecstatic  momentariness  in  fundamental 
ontology.”167
Augenblick  roughly  translates  to  “the  moment”,  but  its  modern usages  are  more 
reminiscent of a particularly short period of time, rather like in English when someone says: 
“I’ll be with you in a second!” We must also in our translation distance ourselves from the 
idea  of  the  “now”,  a  concept  championed  originally  by  Aristotle.  Such  a  position  is 
absolutely  to  be  dismissed  as  Heidegger  himself  states:  “Aristotle  already  saw  the 
phenomenon  of  the  instant,  the  καιρός,  and  he  defined  it  in  the  sixth  book  of  his 
Nicomachean Ethics; but, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific 
time character of the καιρός into connection with what he otherwise knows as time.”  We 168
should translate the “fail” in this statement as a lack of desire to align the concepts, rather 
than that he attempted but was unable to. 
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Thus, we must investigate in what way the “now" is different from the καιρός. From 
the above discussion, there is a feature of the καιρός that lies distinct from that of the “now” 
and that is the idea content and context. The “now” to Aristotle is an instant, a marker of 
time against others; a way of calculating and making public of time. The καιρός is distinctly 
not public, it is individual and “historicitical”, and involves the entire situation of Dasein. 
Aristotle  aligned  the  concept  with  φρόνησῐς,  which  is  a  knowledge  possessed  by  an 
individual with regard to their own being in entirety. As such, we must be careful to bring 
these ideas too closely together - that the καιρός is temporal in the sense of a moment (a 
“now”) - and attempt to draw out whether it relates instead to Heidegger’s conception of the 
moment [das Augenblick] that we find in Being and Time.
The concept of the Augenblick remains part of Heidegger’s thinking long after Being 
and  Time  is  published,  and  in  many  ways  only  becomes  clearer  in  his  later  works.  In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, he explains:
 “Only in the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, in the Augenblick, does it 
make use of that which properly makes it possible, namely time as the Augenblick 
itself.  The Augenblick is  nothing other than the look of resolute disclosedness in 
which the full situation of an action opens itself and keeps itself open. What time as 
entrancing accordingly  keeps  to  itself,  and in  keeping it  to  itself  simultaneously 
announces and tells of as something that can be given to be free, giving it to be 
known  as  possibility,  is  something  of  that  time  itself  and  it  alone  can  be:  the 
Augenblick.”  169
Within this complex definition a familiar phrasing emerges, that of the “resolute self-
disclosure”  and  “announcing”.  This  is  language  directly  borrowing  from  Heidegger’s 
examination of conscience in Being and Time. Resoluteness we will remember is a stance 
toward anxiety,  a determination to remain in and endure anxiety.  It  is  a position toward 
conscience,  a  “wanting  to  have  a  conscience”  that  has  been  described  variously  as  a 
listening,  an  expecting,  literally  an  “unlocked-ness”:  a  kind  of  attuned  waiting.  Such  a 
description leads us easily into a comparison with καιρός.  Καιρός  is  a crucial  event,  a 
happening, which one cannot manufacture but must be prepared for adequately. One awaits 
the καιρός, not as one expects a train to arrive at a certain time, but instead as a stance 
towards the situation. As aforementioned the καιρός announces itself as a time for action, an 
enactment of a different kind of being in the world.  
 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p149169
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The announcing of the καιρός, as sudden and abrupt, is something like an opening. 
In some sense the Augenblick also is permeated with a sense of suddenness, an announcing 
into its openness. The literal meaning of Augenblick is: the blink of an eye. Derrida, in his 
attempt  to  unravel  this  phenomenon,  equates  the  Augenblick  distinctly  with  a  period  of 
altered vision. Bennington outlines this position thus: “[to Derrida] the Augenblick is not a 
moment  (however  short)  of  pure  or  full  seeing  or  insight  at  all,  but  that  its  apparent 
simplicity and self-identity harbors an alterity that means both that it has a duration (it is not 
the pure στιγμή of the νῦν) and that that duration is not a duration of presence—a time of 
seeing during which the eye is open—but an interruption.”  The “event” of the Augenblick 170
thus has a kind of opening. In Being and Time the conscience represents this opening, as that 
sudden jolt that transports Dasein into the Augenblick of authentic time. Again we must be 
cautious not do delineate the  Augenblick  as something that “follows” the conscience in a 
chronological sense, but the correlation between these ideas is quite pronounced. For now 
we  will  leave  this  correlation,  but  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  opening  of  the 
Augenblick as conscience shares a great deal with the Aristotlean καιρός. For now let us 
focus on this idea of a beginning to the moment, which brings along into question the idea of 
its end. 
The Augenblick,  as something that is not always, seems to possess some kind of 
finite  duration,  characterised  by  its  ability  to  be  held  [gehalten].  Its  opening  through 
conscience seems to come to an end not simply described, and a return to entanglement. As 
Zangeneh  pertinently  describes:  “Any  elucidation  of  the  concept  of  Augenblick  must 
understand the latter as designating an activity, an ἔκστασις, some manner of processuality, 
something expressible by an infinitive verb, and not a state, a period, or anything which 
would be conventionally nominal.”  The process to which Zanganeh is referring is most 171
closely displayed in the movement of resoluteness. Heidegger himself states: “Resoluteness 
has its own constancy in itself, so that I do not at all need to repeat the resolution. If I must 
repeat the resolution, I prove that I am not yet resolved. Resoluteness is a distinctive event 
[ausgezeichnetes  Geschehnis]  in  a  happening  [Geschehen].”  So  one  can  “remain” 172
resolved, can exist in such a way as to persist in resolution. Heidegger writes: “The present 
that is held in resoluteness and springs from it we call the Augenblick…In the Augenblick as 
an  ecstasis  the  existent  Dasein  is  carried  away,  as  resolved,  into  the  current  factically 
 Geoffrey Bennington, Scatter 1: The Politics of  Politics in Foucault, Heidegger and Derrida (New York 170
Fordham University Press, 2016) p155
 Hakhamanesh Zangeneh, Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of  Augenblick in Being and 171
Time, International Journal of  Philosophical Studies, 19:4 (Oct 2011) p543 
 Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question of  the Nature of  Language, Trans W Gregory (New York, State 172
University of  New York Press, 2009), p77
Conscience and Time !61
determined  possibilities,  circumstances,  contingencies  of  the  situation  of  its  action.  The 
instant is that which, arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for what 
constitutes  the situation of  action.”  So the duration of  resoluteness  can be seen to be 173
interlinked with the duration of the Augenblick.
The holding of the Augenblick cannot be equated to anything like “being-in-time-
ness”: it is not something measurable. McNeill makes explicit this idea that the Augenblick 
persists: “The Augenblick…is not to be understood as a ‘moment of time’ in the sense of an 
‘instant.’ Rather, it refers to the unfolding disclosure of the presencing of a situation in the 
duration appropriate to it. The Augenblick does not preclude, but indeed demands a certain 
duration, albeit a finite one.”  If we look to our analysis in previous chapters, we shall see 174
that this idea of duration holds very little connection to the idea of the καιρός. In the history 
of the use of the word, including by Aristotle, not one thinker characterises the καιρός as 
something  that  lingers  beyond  its  momentary  significance.  As  such,  in  some  ways  the 
Augenblick  can  be  said  to  correlate  with  the  καιρός,  but  it  is  rather  the  opening,  the 
conscience,  with which it  shares a greater affinity.  However,  we must constantly remind 
ourselves that the experience of Dasein must be taken as a whole, and that all these ideas 
comprise something of the unity of experience that is the temporality of the human being 
there.
One of the few major pieces written in criticism of the linking of the καιρός with 
the Augenblick is an essay by Zangeneh on the topic of Phenomenological Problems for the 
Kairological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time. In his argument against drawing the 
καιρός and the Augenblick into alignment, Zangeneh draws our attention to the difficulties 
in correlating φρόνησῐς with authenticity, the basic tenet upon which this alignment is often 
based.  A famous  essay  examining  the  interconnection  between  Heidegger  and  Aristotle 
written by Franco Volpi, spawned a school of sorts focussed on investigation of the link 
between φρόνησῐς and authenticity, with authentic existence thus understood as a type of 
“phronetic praxis.” This link is further championed by McNeill as previously referred, whose 
reading focusses on aligning Heidegger’s early interpretations of Aristotle with those ideas 
put  forward  in  Being  and  Time.  Zangeneh  challenges  the  link  between  the  καιρός  of 
φρόνησῐς and authenticity in a number of ways, but particularly by drawing our attention to 
the language used by Heidegger in his translation of the movement of φρόνησῐς. Heidegger 
quite uniquely translates a vital passages in the Nicomachean Ethics thus:
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“Thus let us begin by assuming that the modes in which the soul brings and takes 
beings into true safekeeping as unveiled—actualizing this by means of explication in 
speech which either affirms or denies—are five in number: procedures in which one 
is directed to certain tasks and produces [Τέχνη (art)]; defining by way of looking 
at,  discussing,  and identifying  [ἐπιστήμη  (scientific  understanding)];  the  kind  of 
seeing around one which has to do with care for human well-being (circumspection) 
[φρόνησῐς  (prudence)];  the  kind  of  understanding  which  sees  in  an  authentic 
manner [σοφία (wisdom)]; and pure and simple perceiving [νοῦς (intelligence)].”175
What this passage elucidates is that we cannot draw a simple straight line between 
the ideas of φρόνησῐς and authenticity, as even in the language used we can see immediately 
a closeness of authenticity to σοφία rather than φρόνησῐς. McNeill writes: “Phronesis can 
be phronesis, a virtue and an excellence, only if it is also already sophia, only if the latter 
always already infuses and informs it.”  McNeill  himself establishes that the modes of 176
knowledge, if we are to assume a direct correlation with the ideas of Being and Time, would 
require a blurring of the delineations established by Aristotle. φρόνησῐς, as having direct 
effects  on πρᾶξις,  is  delineated as  a  primarily  practical  concern by Aristotle,  and alone 
aligns itself more closely with inauthenticity, that is being in the world with things at hand. 
Heidegger himself asserts that “Aristotle’s Rhetoric must be understood as the first 
systematic  hermeneutics  of  the  everydayness  of  being-with-one-another,”  everydayness 
being a term specifically applied to inauthenticity.  Zangeneh makes the point that: “the 177
interpretation of  the phronological  καιρός…is  irredeemably tied up with descriptions of 
inauthentic  pragmatic  concernful  Dasein”  and  solidifes  this  correlation  by  elucidating 
Heidegger’s use of the terms “Umgang, Fürsorge, Besorgen, Weswegen/Wozu, das Jetzt” 
which are shared in Heidegger’s discussions of inauthenticy and φρόνησῐς  both.  This 178
does not, however, mean that φρόνησῐς does not share some key structures with authenticity 
as we find it described in Being and Time,  but simply that we cannot correlate the ideas 
immediately and exactly. As Dreyfus makes clear in his interpretation of the work, we cannot 
conclude that Being and Time is simply a reaction to Aristotle.  For Heidegger the question 179
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was never simply to bring Aristotle’s conception of being into modernity, but rather to bring 
those  philosophical  ideas  of  his  time  and  the  history  of  philosophy  in  general  into 
“reconception”. As such we must be cautious to place the καιρός and the Augenblick side by 
side as “twins”, when in reality their similarities are only part of a much more complex 
picture.
§ 23 - THE ESCHATOLOGICAL ΚΑΙΡΌΣ
Although the καιρός of Being and Time can be related to Heidegger’s treatment of Aristotle, 
a simple translation of it as the Augenblick does not do justice to the complexity of either 
concept. Thus, it becomes necessary to turn to some of Heidegger’s earlier theological works 
in order to seek clarity. As we outlined previously, in his earlier writings, Heidegger deals 
with the concept of καιρός according to Paul, and attempts to outline its main structures. In 
this, Heidegger focusses on the καιρός as having two distinct traits. The first is that it has to 
do with the coming of the Messiah, an event not yet occurrent but equally inevitable. As such 
we might  attempt  to  correlate  the Paulian καιρός  as  something linked to  an ending.  In 
Aristotle, καιρός also carried this attribute as end to some extent, as the end of deliberation 
and the time for action. In Paul, it is to do with the end of the world itself. On closer analysis, 
however, we see that to conceptualise καιρός as an ending is not really accurate. Even in 
Aristotle, the coming to end of deliberation has to do with the καιρός, but more specifically 
this moment of end is referred to as the ἔσχατον. 
Although certainly related to the καιρός,  the ἔσχατον  brings with it  a  sense of 
finality that the καιρός does not share. For Aristotle, the καιρός “seems much less dramatic 
and  more  associated  with  everyday  practices,  even  if  it  does,  as  moment  of  decision, 
nonetheless  have  an  interruptive  quality  with  respect  to  the  regular  time of  χρόνος.”  180
Equally in Paul and other biblical authors, the term καιρός, although associated with the 
ending of the world, the way in which it is used is to represent something that is already 
present.  In  1  Corinthians  6:2,  Paul  writes:  “For  he  saith,  I  have  heard  thee  in  a  time 
accepted, and in the day of salvation have I succoured thee: behold, now is the accepted time 
[καιρός]; behold, now is the day of salvation.”  For Paul the καιρός is upon the people, 181
and does not represent the end but a new a distinct hope. This is reflected in many other 
biblical passages that follow, in Mark 1:15, for example: “And saying, The time [καιρός] is 
fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand.”  182
 Bennington, Scatter 1, p151180
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Paul utilises several terms in reference to the final coming, and one passage in 1 
Corinthians is of particular importance in this regard. The passage reads: “in a moment, in 
the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be 
raised imperishable,  and we will  be changed.”  Here we see three distinct  terms come 183
together in a description of the end: the moment, the twinkling of an eye, and the last. It 
would be remiss of us not to take note of the tremendous interrelation between these terms 
and the Augenblick. However, and of utmost importance, if we look to the ancient Greek 
from  which  these  translations  came,  we  find  three  distinct  terms:  ἀτόμῳ,  ἐν  ῥιπῇ 
ὀφθαλμοῦ and ἐσχάτῃ respectively. As Dreyfus himself pointed out about this passage and 
others like it: “all the terms that refer to a total transformation of identity and/or world get 
lumped together and identified with the Greek moment of decisive action or καιρός. What is 
surprising is that those concerned with the use of these terms in Heidegger do not bother to 
sort out the various phenomena to which they refer.”  I do not pretend to carry the same 184
conviction in this matter as Dreyfus himself, but the sentiment is clear: The bringing together 
of the καιρός with the Augenblick, even in Paul, is not so simple as a translation, and a great 
deal of care needs to be taken before we draw these ideas too closely together. 
To Heidegger, the Paulian sense of true or “authentic faith”, as afore established, has 
the characteristic of a making present of something futural. It is an attitude toward the future 
as something already upon us and essentially past, to live each moment in the knowledge 
(the holding) of its already having come to an end. The coming of Christ contained within it 
the inevitability of His return, and as something historical it has the character of already 
having been. But equally, the present is of categorical importance to Paul, as that time for the 
individual to live in a way that constantly keeps in mind the future coming. As authentic, 
faith must have the quality of always holding fast to the past, but in such a way that it is 
repeated and carried forward. As such, the “eschatological kairos” as it has been labelled, 
blends multiple ecstasies into one, engaged with history in a certain way, but particularly 
amalgamating  the  future  with  the  present.  Early  Heidegger  established  this  position  as 
something akin to “hope”, that is “it places the accent on a preparatory stance in the present, 
it is a description of a certain comportment which is current.”  In essence, the καιρός has a 185
strange character of being always present, but equally something waited and to be prepared 
for,  that will  come with a suddenness,  and unexpected violence.  Certainly we can relate 
many of these features with the concept of the Augenblick in its entirety as described in 
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Being and Time, but what stands out in particular is its striking similarity to Heidegger’s 
description of conscience. 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Chapter 9 - Concluding Remarks
§ 24 - CONSCIENCE AS ΚΑΙΡΌΣ
We sought at the outset of this exposition to address a question: Can conscience, as it 
is described in Being and Time, be considered as a temporal phenomenon? The impetus for 
asking  this  was  to  clarify,  as  much  as  possible,  the  strange  and  enigmatic  nature  of 
Heidegger’s description. Although vague in its movement, conscience was established by 
Heidegger as the “call of care”, the call of Dasein to Dasein, and thus was necessarily to do 
with its overall movement as occurrence. Thus, part of the purpose of this work is also to 
situate conscience more clearly within the movement of Dasein.  From the outset,  it  was 
made clear that  conscience is  not something that  “happens” as an event in the series of 
recordable events “in” time, but still occurs in a specific way. Conscience is not something to 
be waited for, but rather held as a possibility, to be listened out for. This speaks to authentic 
Dasein’s  position  towards  death,  as  something  to  be  held  in  the  possibility  that  death 
essentially always is. The attunement of conscience as anxiety showed the way it is always 
already there, pursuing Dasein in uncanniness. For this reason, the nature of the preparation 
-  that  was  established  as  conscience  itself  -  was  correlated  with  a  kind  of  courage,  a 
resoluteness and stillness in the face of anxiety and that which conscience brings to light. 
The temporal nature of guilt was also clarified, as to do with the always outstanding nature 
of Dasein.  Thus,  the phenomena of death,  anxiety,  guilt  among others were fitted neatly 
within the ecstatic construction of Dasein as it is unfolded in Being and Time. 
We  must  not  forget,  however,  that  these  phenomena  cannot  be  understood  in 
isolation from one another, nor from conscience, as they all form part of the unity of Dasein 
as care. Thus, in clarifying the temporality of these phenomena we in a way also bringing 
conscience  into  greater  clarity.  However,  conscience  stands  distinct  from  these  other 
phenomena  for  two  reasons.  First,  conscience  is  explicitly  described  by  Heidegger  as 
discourse, part of its overall disclosive movement. And second, where the temporality of 
these  phenomena  can  be  made  apparent  relatively  simply,  conscience  is  necessarily 
enigmatic. Thus, despite our efforts, conscience remained excepted from care in some sense, 
largely due to the difficulty in locating the specific temporality of discourse. However, our 
analysis of Heidegger’s Paul, through The Phenomenology of Religion, revealed to us a hope 
of  drawing  together  the  distinct  ideas  of  attestation,  the  call  and  conscience  with  the 
conceptions of authentic time, history and enactment. We showed that, although juvenile in 
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its formulation in this early work, the καιρός is of vital import in understanding authenticity 
and conscience as described in Being and Time.
From Heidegger’s convoluted and vague descriptions of the phenomenon, we have 
been able to identify that there is a kind of movement inherent in conscience, as something 
that is involved with change. In the preceding chapters we have shown conscience to have 
the character of something both expected and to be prepared for, but equally sudden and 
disruptive in its  coming to be present.  It  has a transformative role,  that  effects  Dasein’s 
position towards its history and temporality: Dasein itself. Importantly, the occurrence of 
conscience is distinctly demarcated from the flow of time that is shared with others, although 
bound up with it in a specific way. What was reveal in the previous chapter was that these 
aspects reflect distinctly the specific temporality of the καιρός. The καιρός, to Heidegger’s 
Paul, is an inevitability, an imminent event that is a call to preparation. In its coming it is 
also  sudden,  violent  in  its  way,  and  comes  over  the  individual  as  something  vital  and 
individual. Where to Aristotle it is a call for a certain kind of action, to Paul it is more than 
that; it is a reason for a transformation of enactment, the very movement of life, time and 
history all. It is temporal; distinct from yet bound up with the χρόνος that is sharable and 
measurable. We have also displayed through Aristotle and Isocrates both, the way that it is 
bound up with λόγος  absolutely.  Thus,  this  essay posits  that  conscience is  temporal,  so 
closely does it resemble the “kairological” temporality here described.
In order to locate this specific temporal movement within the overall movement of 
Dasein, we must be cautious not to rely to heavily on either Aristotle or Paul, but keep in 
mind that both of these influences were brought together in a complex reworking in Being 
and Time. As afore established, it is possible to relate the καιρός, based on translations by 
Heidegger himself, to the Augenblick, but such a correlation is not direct. What stands out 
about the καιρός is its character as a kind of opening; its abruptness and suddenness are not 
capable of being held. The Augenblick of Being and Time is thus at odds with the καιρός, as 
its significance lies in its being held. One does not hold conscience, as with the καιρός, but 
awaits it or prepares for it as possibility. For this reason, rather than the Augenblick, the 
conscience - as that which opens up the authentic moment - is itself more akin to the καιρός. 
However, as unified, Dasein in authenticity is not to be considered as a composite entity, the 
Augenblick does not “follow”, is not “annexed” to, conscience, but rather these movements 
must be understood together. Any “kairoloigical” reading of the Second Division of Being 
and Time cannot restrict its interpretation to the discussion of the “moment”, but must take 
into  account  this  unity  and involve  conscience  from the  outset.  Thus,  we conclude  that 
conscience is in a sense “kairological”, and as temporal in this way it is secured more firmly 
as a phenomenon “of” time, an expression of the movement of care. What remains at large, 
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however, is how the discoursing nature of Dasein - that conscience essentially is - coheres to 
this temporal structure.
§ 25 - THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCOURSE
The temporality of discourse in Being and Time is clearly complex, but its explicit 
explanation spans little more than a single page, a minor subsection of §68. At the time of its 
writing in 1927, discourse to Heidegger does not necessarily belong to any one of the three 
distinct temporal ecstasies, but rather is described as being “in itself temporal.”  Discourse 186
is disclosure, and disclosure has to do with all that Dasein is in all its temporal movements. 
Heidegger explains that: “The disclosedness of the there and the fundamental existentiell 
possibilities  of  Dasein,  authenticity  and  inauthenticity,  are  founded  in  temporality.  But 
disclosedness always pertains equiprimordially to the whole of being-in-the-world…”  In a 187
sense, discourse is able to range over all of the ecstasies, due to its ability to engage with 
them, that is disclose them, in its expression. Dasein is essentially its disclosure, and thus 
discourse - as part of the disclosive movement - moves temporally as Dasein does. But this 
description does little to unravel the enigma of discourse, particularly in its silent expression. 
In Being and Time, as Powell makes explicit, temporality might even be said to be 
dependent  on  discourse  in  a  way,  as  a  result  of  understanding  and  attunement  being 
determined  through  the  being  of  language  that  is  "equiprimordially  determined  by 
discourse.”  The nature of this relation remains one of the mysteries of Dasein at the close 188
of the Second Division. The conclusion of Being and Time leaves the reader with a sense that 
much  is  left  unclarified,  not  only  because  it  is  unfinished,  but  also  because  its  subject, 
Dasein, remains largely in the shadows. This is perhaps because Heidegger is sees he is 
grappling  with  necessarily  mystifying  and  enigmatic  subjects.  Brogan  describes  this 
enigmatic quality of Dasein as a kind of “strangeness", and equates this to Dasein’s distance 
from itself. He writes: 
“In this doubling of distance, Dasein is open to the estrangement of its own being as 
its most proper way of being. Dasein is a stranger to itself. It is clear that this sense 
of not being at home with oneself is more than the discomfort of Das Man in its 
evasion, though it is certainly the source of this. More so, I think, this call from afar, 
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this  voice  of  conscience,  is  the  horizon  of  Dasein’s  being  that  is  never  to  be 
overcome or surpassed.”  189
Conscience in Being and Time represents this “stranger” or the unnamed “friend” 
that every Dasein carries with it, which brings us also to the strangeness of discourse itself. 
Heidegger, in his later works, describes the λόγος as fundamentally difficult to grasp, as that 
which  is  too  close  to  Dasein  to  be  made  clear:  “The  logos  is  what  human  beings  are 
continually amid and what they are away from all the same, absently present; they are thus 
the  axunetoi,  those  who  do  not  grasp.”  Yet  somehow,  it  is  from  out  of  this  silent 190
mysteriousness, that the nature of being or beings finds its expression. Heidegger makes this 
explicit  in  his  Letter  on Humanism,  writing:  “Language is  the house of  being,  which is 
propriated by being and pervaded by being.  And so it  is  proper  to think the essence of 
language from its correspondence to being and indeed as this correspondence, that is, as the 
home of the human beings essence.”  Thus, this essay asserts not that conscience needs to 191
be  redetermined  as  only  a  temporal  phenomenon,  but  rather  that  perhaps  discourse  and 
temporality might be considered together, as the uncertain, enigmatic and amorphous ground 
upon which all aspects of experience are made possible.
Krzysztof Ziarek, in his essay Giving Its Word: Event (as) Language, attempts to 
highlight more clearly the specific movement of discourse as an occurrence or an event. 
Ziarek’s focus is on two later writings of Heidegger’s: Contributions to Philosophy and On 
the  Way  to  Language  and  what  he  describes  as  a  “turnabout  from the  notion  of  Rede 
(discourse) in Being and Time  to the notions of saying (Sage),  way-making (Bewëgung), 
word (Wort), and signs (Wörter).”  By this stage in Heidegger’s thought, “words” are not 192
those written or spoken expressions that come into being with others, but instead the term is 
used to “describe a different dimension of language, one that constitutes its  originary or 
originative momentum. This momentum is the leap,  the origin (Ur-sprung),  of language, 
which, by giving being to beings, makes room for signification and signs.”  In On the Way 193
to Language the “word” is described as “the word of being, which means the reticence of the 
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decision [Austrag] (event [Ereignis]), originary clearing”  It is described as a stillness, the 194
in-between, the “there” of being.   The word is essentially silent, marked by its failure to 195
come into expression. 
This  new  conceptualisation  of  discourse  resonates  distinctly  with  conscience  as 
described in Being and Time. Essentially, the word is the origin place of language, it marks 
the movement of Dasein from its abysmal silence into being and a relation to beings in 
general. The coming to words of discourse evolves for Heidegger to become the basis for 
understanding  the  temporality  of  Dasein  in  its  most  primordial  realm.  As  an  “event”, 
discourse is situated within experience as something that constitutes any coming into time at 
all. Ziarek outlines that: “the event “tunes” (stimmt) the humans to how being has, in the 
blink of an eye, always already unfolded in its spatio-temporal leap/origin into the “here and 
now,” that is, unfolded as the moment (Augenblick).”  A kind of event that opens Dasein to 196
the moment is easily brought into alignment with our earlier description of conscience. 
What is perhaps most remarkable about Heidegger’s conception of conscience, is its 
apparent  disappearance,  after  a  very  brief  period of  emphasis  in  Being and Time  alone. 
Heidegger had countless opportunities to investigate the idea, particularly in his work on 
Paul, but did not do so. In his work on Aristotle, he remarks on it only in passing, despite his 
establishing it as the ground for φρόνησῐς, one of the most important Aristotlean concepts 
that he investigates at great length. Seemingly quite suddenly in Being and Time, it appears 
as  a  fundamental  and  most  vital  component  of  Dasein’s  path  to  authenticity,  only  to 
apparently disappear in later works. But, only a few years after the publishing of Being and 
Time, Polt describes an apparent revolution of thinking for Heidegger. He writes: “In the fall 
of  1933,  Professor  and  Rector  Martin  Heidegger  announces  to  his  students  that  he  has 
overturned  his  former  understanding  of  language  and  silence.  Whereas  Being  and  Time 
described  speaking  and  keeping  silent  as  two  modes  of  discourse,  Heidegger  now sees 
speech  and  discourse  themselves  as  founded  on  a  deep  silence  in  which  the  world  is 
disclosed.”  It seems to be that our question of conscience, the rather confusing silent call, 197
finds a new emphasis in Heidegger’s later thinking. 
At the outset of this essay we brought the language of conscience into question, 
asking  whether  Heidegger  was  justified  in  labelling  this  phenomenon  as 
“conscience”  [Gewissen]  at  all.  In  a  poetic  sense,  his  choice  of  language  was  clearly 
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warranted. We cannot ignore that the historical usages of the term Gewissen, as a kind of 
inner voice that follows along, resonate deeply with the silent “birthplace” of authentic voice 
outlined in Being and Time. Further, its close relation Gewiss [certain], aligns nicely with 
Heidegger’s  idea  of  authenticity.  Such  interconnections  are  of  clear  importance.  Our 
temporal reading of conscience, however,  seems to indicate that the label of the καιρός 
might perhaps be more appropriate for the phenomenon, given its clear similarities. Indeed, 
Heidegger’s conception of conscience can, and must, be considered as something temporal, 
which we established at the outset as the source of unity for Dasein in Being and Time. 
However, to rename Heidegger's conscience as καιρός is to make its vital interrelation with 
discourse  less  distinct.  Thus,  we  must  here  make  explicit  that  our  temporal  reading  of 
conscience does not seek to distance conscience from its classification as discourse, rather its 
purpose  is  to  elucidate  the  fact  that,  to  Heidegger,  temporality  and discourse  should  be 
considered as seated together in the very most primordial movement of Dasein as whole. 
Such a relationship is found only in its infancy in Being and Time, and thus this essay points 
to  a  further  investigation  of  Heidegger’s  later  work  and  an  examination  of  the  specific 
relationship between temporality and discourse that remains as yet in the shadows.  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